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Abstract 
Researcher: Mariko Genevieve Doskow 
Title: Analysis of the Impact of Scenario-Based Training on the Aeronautical 
 Decision Making of Collegiate Flight Students  
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The persistence of faulty decision making as a primary cause of accidents indicates a 
need to train pilots to make better decisions. The purpose of this study was to analyze 
scenario-based training’s effectiveness at improving the aeronautical decision making of 
collegiate flight students. The researcher scored each participant’s aeronautical decision 
making as they completed simulated flights in an advanced aviation training device. The 
scores quantified the participants’ aeronautical decision making on seven decision-
making variables and served as the basis for generating an overall decision making score 
for each participant. The experimental group completed a scenario-based aeronautical 
decision making treatment between their simulated flights. Chronbach’s alpha analyses 
verified the scoring’s internal reliability. Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon tests compared 
the participants’ decision making before and after the experimental treatment. Although 
there were practical improvements, the differences were not statistically significant. The 
practical significance of the results suggests that further research is required. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Human error continues to be a leading cause of General Aviation (GA) accidents 
and incidents. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA, 1991) attributed 52% of fatal 
GA accidents to pilot error. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) cited 
personnel-related causes or factors in 91% of GA accidents in 2006 (NTSB, 2006). The 
2010 Nall Report cited 70% of non-commercial fixed-wing accidents in 2009 and 63% of 
fatal non-commercial fixed-wing accidents in 2009 as pilot-related (Aircraft Owners and 
Pilots Association [AOPA], 2010). The 2009 rate of pilot-related accidents – 4.63 per 
100,000 flight hours – was consistent with the rate of pilot-related accidents in 2008 and 
for the period, 2000-2008 (AOPA, 2009; AOPA, 2010).  
The NTSB subdivided personnel-related causes of accidents into human 
performance issues such as aircraft control and handling, planning and decision-making, 
and use of aircraft equipment (NTSB, 2006). Of the accidents in 2006 for which the 
NTSB cited a human performance cause or factor, “the most frequently cited cause/factor 
was aircraft handling and control (71%), followed by planning and decision-making 
(36%)” (NTSB, 2006, p. 48). The 2010 Nall Report divided pilot-related accidents into 
different categories than the NTSB. There were no categories related specifically to 
decision-making or judgment, but AOPA discussed decision-making’s impact on many 
of the categories it used to describe GA accidents. The report stated that “the judgment 
leading to any pilot-related accident could be called into question” (AOPA, 2010, p. 17). 
Fuel-management and weather accidents were singled out as being “primarily […] 
failures of flight planning and in-flight decision-making” (AOPA, 2010, p. 17). The 
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report mentioned the possibility of pilots underestimating the risks associated with the 
takeoff phase of flight as a contributing factor to the high number of takeoff phase 
accidents (AOPA, 2010). Many maneuvering accidents also resulted from risky 
maneuvers initiated at low altitudes. The majority began with a loss of control or stall at 
altitudes too low to recover, indicating that “these accidents were more tied to poor 
judgment than lack of knowledge or skill” (AOPA, 2010, p. 24). 
Decision-making errors may be under-reported, even when they are identified as a 
separate category. The 2010 Nall Report did not provide statistics for how many 
accidents resulted from poor risk management or faulty aeronautical decision making 
(ADM) (AOPA, 2010). The NTSB’s reviews reported that 36% of personnel-related GA 
accidents were caused by poor planning or decision-making, but coded each accident 
with a single defining event code instead of performing root cause analysis and reporting 
each of the causes and factors found (NTSB, 2006). Meanwhile, a recent study (Wright, 
2009) applied root cause analysis to 29 fatal accidents involving a popular GA aircraft.  
The study concluded that 25 of those accidents could have been avoided using 
fundamental risk management procedures or higher order thinking skills (HOTS) such as 
ADM and single pilot resource management (Wright, 2009). Only four of those accidents 
resulted from the pilot’s faulty aircraft handling (Wright, 2009).   
The search for a better method of acquiring judgment in aviation led to a 
significant body of research on judgment or ADM and how to train it. Since Jensen’s 
1982 study, the premise that judgment can be taught has been accepted in academia and 
commercial aviation (FAA, 1991). GA, however, has been slow to accept that judgment 
can be taught or come to a consensus on how to train ADM. The FAA has also been slow 
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to provide guidance on how to provide ADM training. Much of the guidance the FAA 
provided had not been updated as recently as the early 2000s (“FAA-Industry,” 2003).   
Significant efforts to improve formal ADM training in GA include projects by the 
FAA Center For General Aviation Research (CGAR), the FAA Industry Training 
Standard (FITS) program, and the Society of Aviation and Flight Educators (SAFE). 
CGAR is a consortium of aviation universities conducting research to make significant 
improvements in safety and efficiency for GA air transportation (CGAR, 2005). The 
FITS program is a collaboration of FAA, industry, and the FAA Center of Excellence for 
GA. FITS formed with a mission to improve safety by reducing human error in GA with 
a new training philosophy that accelerates the acquisition of higher-level judgment and 
decision-making skills (FITS Master Instructor Syllabus, 2006). Goals include 
developing adaptive training and industry standards for the GA community (FAA-
Industry Training Standards [FITS] program plan, 2003). SAFE is an organization of 
aviation educators “fostering professionalism and excellence in aviation through 
continuing education, professional standards, and accreditation” (“About SAFE,” 2012, 
para. 1). SAFE’s Mission Statement states that they seek to “create a safer environment 
through enhanced education” (“Vision & Mission Statement,” 2012, Mission Statement, 
para. 1). 
New training strategies that emphasize ADM and other mental skills in GA 
training have been proposed as the key to meaningfully reforming the entire GA training 
paradigm (SAFE, 2011a). GA flight training remained mostly unchanged from the 
maneuvers-based focus of the Civilian Pilot Training (CPT) program as recently as 2009. 
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Meanwhile GA accident rates – particularly for decision-making, human error accidents – 
remained stagnant, illustrating the need to reform GA training (Wright 2009).  
FITS researchers argued that implementing a scenario-based training (SBT) 
paradigm in GA training was imperative to better prepare GA pilots because the flight 
environment is becoming increasingly challenging as well (“FITS Master,” 2006). Higher 
performance technologically advanced aircraft (TAA) are increasingly putting pilots with 
less experience and training into situations that require flight management and decision-
making skills normally expected from air transport pilot (ATP) certificated pilots (“FITS 
Master,” 2006). Evolution of technology in GA aircraft such as displays and automation 
has rapidly outpaced training programs and the guidance, standardization, and 
certification (GSC) provided by the FAA. This increasing disparity exacerbates the 
current GA training paradigm’s deficiency in teaching adequate ADM (“FITS Master,” 
2006). 
Significance of the Study 
Improving the ADM of GA pilots would have a significant impact on the safety of 
individual GA pilots and on the health of the greater GA community. Faulty ADM 
contributed to a significant percentage of past fatal GA accidents; improving ADM 
ability in GA pilots could prevent many future fatal GA accidents (“FAA-Industry 
Training Standards (FITS) Program Plan,” 2003; Wright, 2009). Improved GA safety 
would have the additional benefit of improving the general public’s perception of GA 
safety which would enable GA growth (Wright, 2009). 
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Statement of the Problem 
Human errors in judgment continue to be a leading cause of aviation accidents 
and incidents while GA accident rates have failed to improve significantly during the last 
decade (AOPA, 2010). Stagnant accident rates indicate that the current training system in 
GA has reached the limits of its usefulness for training safer pilots. The persistence of 
faulty decision making as a primary cause of human error and pilot-related accidents 
indicates a specific need to train pilots to make better decisions (SAFE, 2011a). Past 
research has hypothesized that ADM can be taught, and is not merely a by-product of 
experience (FAA, 1991; Jensen, 1982; “FITS Master,” 2006). However, the majority of 
GA has not yet implemented an effective method of teaching ADM despite a clear need 
for pilots to improve their ADM skills (SAFE, 2011a).  
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the effectiveness of scenario-based 
ADM training in improving ADM in collegiate flight students.  
Hypothesis  
There was a difference in demonstrated ADM between pilots who received 
scenario-based ADM training and pilots who did not receive scenario-based ADM 
training, for flight students enrolled in a baccalaureate program at the Daytona Beach 
campus of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU).    
Delimitations 
Delimitations for this study included limitations on time and population. The 
researcher completed the experimental portion of this study entirely within the Fall 2011 
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semester. The population for this study was limited to ERAU student pilots, solicited 
from various class sections and student organizations.  
Limitations and Assumptions 
Budget was a major limitation of the study, limiting the number of participants the 
researcher could include, and the scope of the treatment the researcher could provide. 
Time was another major limitation of the study. Also, the fact that one researcher 
conducted the entire experiment, including the training and the scoring, made the 
possibility of bias a limitation of the study.  
The self-selected nature of the sample was another limitation of the study, as was 
the diversity of experience levels in the sample. The original selection criteria for 
participants limited the participants to those with fewer than 500 hours of total flight time 
logged and who held at least a private pilot certificate but did not hold any flight 
instructor certificates. However, the small number of participants who fit the original 
selection criteria motivated the researcher to include all willing participants. Including all 
the participants meant accepting a wider range of experience levels in the sample to 
include student pilots as well as certificated flight instructors (CFIs).  
Assumptions of this study included the ability of all parties to understand and 
communicate effectively in English; English was not the first language for some of the 
participants but every effort was made to ensure mutual understanding. It was assumed 
that the researcher was able to accurately assess the participants’ decision making 
throughout the experiment. This study also assumed that the participants answered 
debrief questions honestly and refrained from discussing the experiment with each other 
between sessions, as requested by the researcher.  
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Definition of Terms 
Advanced Aviation Training Device (AATD): a fixed-base flight simulator 
equipped with full digitally-loaded flight controls, an instrument 
panel, and a video screen (Frasca International, Inc., 2010).  
Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM): “A systematic approach to the mental 
process used by aircraft pilots to consistently determine the best 
course of action in response to a given set of circumstances” (FAA, 
1991, p. ii). 
Active Pilot: A pilot who holds both a pilot certificate and a valid medical 
certificate issued within the last 25 months (NTSB, 2011a). 
Attitude: “A personal motivational predisposition to respond to persons, 
situations, or events in a given manner that can, nevertheless, be 
changed or modified through training. A sort of mental shortcut to 
decision making” (FAA, 1991, p. ii). 
Attitude Management: “The ability to recognize hazardous attitudes in oneself 
and the willingness to modify them as necessary through the 
application of an appropriate antidote thought” (FAA, 1991, p. ii). 
FAA Center For General Aviation Research (CGAR): A consortium of aviation 
universities conducting research to make significant improvements 
in safety and efficiency for GA air transportation (CGAR, 2005).  
Crew Resource Management (CRM, formerly Cockpit Resource Management): 
“In multiperson crew configurations, the effective use of all 
personnel and material assets available to a flight crew. CRM 
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emphasizes good communication and interpersonal relationship 
skills” (FAA, 1991, p. ii). 
Decision Process Used: A metric used to quantify a participant’s aeronautical 
decision making; describes whether the participant’s actions 
evidenced a systematic approach in the decision-making process 
(FAA, 1991).  
FAA Industry Training Standard (FITS): The FITS program is a collaboration of 
FAA, industry, and the Center of Excellence for General Aviation. 
Goals include developing adaptive training and industry standards 
for the GA community (“FAA-Industry Training Standards [FITS] 
Program Plan,” 2003).  
Headwork: Mental work “required to accomplish a conscious, rational thought 
process when making decisions. Good decision making involves 
risk identification and assessment, information processing, and 
problem solving” (FAA, 1991, p. iii). 
Higher Order Thinking Skills (HOTS): Analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. 
Levels of cognition which are “essential to judgment, ADM, and 
critical thinking” (FAA, 2008a, p. 2-5).  
Judgment: “The mental process of recognizing and analyzing all pertinent 
information in a particular situation, a rational evaluation of 
alternative actions in response to it, and a timely decision on which 
action to take” (FAA, 1991, p. iii). 
9 
 
Margin of Safety: “The difference between pilot capabilities and task 
requirements” (FAA, 1991, p. 17). 
Overall ADM: A numerical score calculated by the researcher to quantify a 
participant’s aeronautical decision making ability. 
Personal Checklist: The checklist of “basic principles that cannot be compromised 
[including] what not to do” (FAA, 1991, p. 23) The IMSAFE 
checklist is an example of a personal checklist (FAA, 1991, p. 24). 
Personality: “The embodiment of personal traits and characteristics of an 
individual that are set at a very early age and extremely resistant to 
change” (FAA, 1991, p. iii). 
Poor Judgment Chain: “A series of mistakes that may lead to an accident or 
incident” (FAA, 1991, p. iii). 
Problem-Based Learning (PBL): Lessons structured to confront students with 
real-world problems and force them to reach realistic solutions by 
practicing problem-solving skills (FAA, 2008a). Variations of PBL 
include SBT, collaborative problem-solving, and case study (FAA, 
2008a). 
Problem Comprehended: A metric used to quantify a participant’s aeronautical 
decision making analogous to Endsley’s (2000) Level 2 SA, 
Comprehension; refers to the participant’s ability to integrate 
“multiple pieces of information and a determination of their 
relevance to the person’s goals” (Endsley, 2000, p. 4). 
10 
 
Problem Detected: A metric used to quantify a participant’s aeronautical decision 
making analogous to Endsley’s (2000) Level 1 SA, Perception; 
refers to the “perception of cues [and] needed information”, or the 
participant’s ability to perceive a problem (Endsley, 2000, p. 3). 
Problem Projected: A metric used to quantify a participant’s aeronautical decision 
making analogous to Endsley’s (2000) Level 3 SA, Projection; 
refers to the ability to “forecast future situation events and 
dynamics” (Endsley, 2000, p. 4). 
Problem Resolved: A metric used to quantify a participant’s aeronautical decision 
making; describes whether the participant’s reaction to a problem 
adequately addressed the risk associated with that problem.  
Risk Management: “The part of the decision making process which relies on 
situational awareness, problem recognition, and good judgment to 
reduce risks associated with each flight” (FAA, 1991, p. iii). 
Risk Elements: “The four fundamental risk elements are the pilot, the aircraft, the 
environment, and the type of operation that comprise any given 
aviation situation” (FAA, 1991, p. iii). 
Safe Outcome: A metric used to quantify a participant’s aeronautical decision 
making; describes whether the participant’s reaction to a problem 
returned the flight to a state in which “the possibility of harm to 
persons or of property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or 
below, an acceptable level” (International Civil Aviation 
Organization [ICAO], 2009, p. 2-2).  
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Scenario-Based Training (SBT): “A training system that uses a highly structured 
script of real-world experiences to address flight training 
objectives in an operational environment” (“FITS Master,” 2006, 
p. 5). 
Situation Awareness (SA, formerly Situational Awareness): “The accurate 
perception and understanding of all the factors and conditions 
within the four fundamental risk elements that affect safety before, 
during, and after the flight” (FAA, 1991, p. iii). Also, “the 
perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of 
time and space, comprehension of their meaning and the projection 
of their status in the near future” (Endsley, 2000, p. 3)  
Skills and Procedures: “The procedural, psychomotor, and perceptual skills used 
to control a specific aircraft or its systems. They are the stick and 
rudder or airmanship abilities that are gained through conventional 
training, are perfected, and become almost automatic through 
experience” (FAA, 1991, p. iii). 
Society of Aviation and Flight Educators (SAFE): An organization of aviation 
educators that works with industry partners and the FAA to 
provide aviation education resources; goals include fostering 
professionalism, excellence, and safety (“About SAFE,” 2012).  
Stress:  “The body’s nonspecific response to demands placed on it, 
whether those demands are pleasant or unpleasant” (FAA, 1991, p. 
17). 
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Stress Management: “The personal analysis of the kinds of stress experienced 
while flying, the application of appropriate stress assessment tools, 
and other coping mechanisms” (FAA, 1991, p. iii). 
Timely Manner: A metric used to quantify a participant’s aeronautical decision 
making; describes whether the participant “execute[d] a suitable 
course of action within the time frame permitted by the situation” 
(Jensen, 1982, p. 64).  
List of Acronyms 
3P Perceive, Process, Perform  
5 Ps Plan, Plane, Pilot, Passengers, Programming 
AATD Advanced Aviation Training Device 
ACT Aircrew Coordination Training 
ADM Aeronautical Decision Making 
AFD Airport Facility Directory  
AOPA Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 
AQP Advanced Qualification Program 
ASI Air Safety Institute (formerly the AOPA Safety Foundation) 
ATP Air Transport Pilot 
CFI Certificated Flight Instructor 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
CGAR Center For General Aviation Research 
CPT Civilian Pilot Training 
CRM Crew Resource Management 
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DECIDE Detect, Estimate, Choose, Identify, Do, Evaluate 
DESIDE Detect, Estimate, Set safety objectives, Identify, Do, Evaluate 
DOT Department of Transportation 
ERAU Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FATE Fly the airplane, Assess the situation, Take action, Evaluate (a 
Northwest Airlines ADM model) 
FITS FAA-Industry Training Standards 
FTD Flight Training Device 
FOR-DEC Facts, Options, Risks & Benefits, Decision, Execution, Check 
GA General Aviation 
GAJSC General Aviation Joint Steering Committee 
GAMA General Aviation Manufacturers Association 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GSC Guidance, Standardization, and Certification 
HAL High Altitude Lab 
HOTS Higher Order Thinking Skills 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization  
IMSAFE Illness, Medication, Stress, Alcohol, Fatigue, Eating 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
IP Instructor pilot 
LCD  Liquid Crystal Display 
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LOFT Line Oriented Flight Training 
MBT Maneuver-Based Training 
MFD Multi-Function Display 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
PASS Problem identification, Acquire information, Survey strategy, 
Select strategy 
PAVE Pilot in command, Aircraft, enVironment, and External pressures  
PBL Problem-Based Learning 
PIC Pilot In Command 
PJ Poor Judgment 
POH Pilot’s Operating Handbook  
PTS Practical Test Standards 
RPM Revolutions Per Minute 
SA Situation Awareness 
SAFE Society of Aviation and Flight Educators 
SBT Scenario-Based Training 
SHOR Stimuli, Hypotheses, Options, Response 
SOAR Situation, Options, Act, Repeat 
SRM Single Pilot Resource Management 
TAA Technologically Advanced Aircraft 
UND University of North Dakota 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
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VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions 
VOR Very High Frequency (VHF) Omnidirectional Radio range 
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Chapter II 
Review of the Relevant Literature 
Research into ADM began with developing several key concepts. What 
eventually became known as ADM was first called judgment. Early research investigated 
the correlation between judgment and experience, testing the traditional assumption that 
good judgment developed naturally as a by-product of gaining experience. Other research 
sought to define expert ADM while still more research identified the component 
behaviors and mental skills (such as risk management, HOTS, and situation awareness 
[SA]) associated with expert ADM. Analysis of accident statistics throughout the 
evolution of ADM training served to indicate how effective different training 
methodologies were (FAA, 1991).  
Judgment, ADM, and HOTS 
Jensen and Benel (as cited in Diehl, 1992) developed a taxonomy of human error 
that separated decisional task errors from procedural and perceptualmotor errors. They 
defined decisional errors as errors in mental processes such as planning and evaluation, 
and emphasized judgment’s association with the “complex cognitive processes involved 
in human decision making” (Diehl, 1992, p. 5). Analysis of aircrew errors from major 
accidents showed that decisional errors constituted 52%, 56%, and 53% of aircrew errors 
made in GA, airline, and military accidents respectively (Diehl, 1992). 
Researchers later began referring to decisional tasks as judgment, or decisional 
judgment (Jensen, 1982; Diehl, 1992). Jensen (1982) presented a working definition of 
judgment that applied to aviation:  
17 
 
(1) The ability to search for and establish the relevance of all available 
information regarding a situation, to specify alternative courses of action, and to 
determine expected outcomes from each alternative.  
(2) The motivation to choose and authoritatively execute a suitable course of 
action within the time frame permitted by the situation, where: (a) “Suitable” is an 
alternative consistent with societal norms; (b) “Action” includes no action, some 
action, or action to seek more information. (p. 64) 
Jensen’s definition of judgment described it as a combination of many complementary 
mental functions and incorporated both cognitive and motivational components. Other 
common terms for this combination of mental functions included “headwork” and 
“staying ahead of the aircraft” (Jensen, 1982). The FAA has since defined judgment as 
“the mental process of recognizing and analyzing all pertinent information in a particular 
situation, a rational evaluation of alternative actions in response to it, and a timely 
decision on which action to take” (FAA, 1991, p. iii).  
Over time, ADM became the more common term used to describe these mental 
tasks. The FAA defined ADM as “a systematic approach to the mental process used by 
aircraft pilots to consistently determine the best course of action in response to a given set 
of circumstances” (FAA, 1991, p. ii). The FAA’s definition of ADM shared many 
characteristics with Jensen’s earlier definition of judgment, although the FAA’s 
definition simplified Jensen’s (1982) itemized list of mental tasks as “the mental process” 
(FAA, 1991, p. iii). An understanding of this “mental process” was developed over many 
years of research.  
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Bloom’s research on the cognitive domain of learning provided valuable insight 
into the mental processes associated with ADM. Specifically, Bloom’s taxonomy of the 
cognitive domain gave aviation researchers an accurate, theoretical description of those 
mental processes (FAA, 2008a). Researchers refined the definition of ADM using the 
taxonomy’s more complex levels of thinking, known as the HOTS. Bloom’s taxonomy 
described six levels of thinking behaviors that progressed along a continuum from simple 
to complex: knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation 
(FAA, 2008a). Analysis involved recognizing, examining, and understanding information 
from the environment. Synthesis involved combining information into a new and 
integrated whole. Evaluation involved judging the benefits and disadvantages of an idea 
or phenomenon (FAA, 2008a). HOTS were so essential to judgment and decision-making 
that the FAA used HOTS to partially define ADM for aviation instructors (FAA, 2008a).  
SA (formerly Situational Awareness) 
Research into the decision-making process included investigations into a related 
mental process known as SA (formerly situational awareness). Endsley (2000) defined 
SA as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and 
space, comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near 
future” (p. 3), or more simply as “knowing what is going on around you” (p. 2). Her 
Theoretical Underpinnings of Situation Awareness: A Critical Review provided an 
overview of the SA construct and associated terms (Endsley, 2000).  
Endsley (2000) explained that making a decision, like any other task, was enabled 
by accurate SA. The relationship between SA and ADM was more probabilistic than a 
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direct correlation. High SA increased the probability of successful ADM, but did not 
guarantee it (Endsley, 2000).  
Endsley (2000) divided SA into three levels, with each level enabling the next. 
Level 1 SA, perception, involved distinguishing important information from the 
environment via a sensory organ (Endsley, 2000). Level 2 SA, comprehension, involved 
combining and interpreting perceived information to derive meaning about the current 
situation (Endsley, 2000). Level 3 SA, projection, described the ability to predict the 
future state of a situation based on an understanding of the current situation (Endsley, 
2000).  
Endsley and Garland (2000) reported that SA was a “considerable challenge in 
[GA] as GA pilots are frequently less experienced and less current than operators for 
major airlines” (p. 357). They observed that a common SA error in low experience GA 
pilots was a tendency to overestimate their skill level and underestimate the severity or 
risk of a situation. There is a need to improve GA pilots’ SA, as Endsley and Garland 
(2000) discussed in their paper, Pilot Situation Awareness Training in General Aviation.  
GA Pilots 
GA pilots need improved ADM training in order to improve GA safety. GA 
includes all aviation except military and scheduled commercial operations (General 
Aviation Manufacturers Association [GAMA], 2011). GA pilots fly aircraft ranging from 
two-seat trainers to long-range jets. GA pilots have varying levels of certifications and 
hours logged, and generally do not receive as much recurrent training as military or 
commercial pilots (Endsley & Garland, 2000). GA also serves as the main training 
environment for future commercial airline pilots (GAMA, 2011). 
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GA suffered the highest accident rates in civil aviation in the last decade (NTSB, 
2012). The overall accident rate remained at around six accidents per 100,000 flight 
hours, and the fatal accident rate remained at around one accident per 100,000 flight 
hours (NTSB, 2011a). By comparison, accident rates for Part 121 operations 
continuously improved over the last decade and dropped to 0.152 and 0.006 accidents per 
100,000 flight hours for total and fatal accidents, respectively, in 2009 (NTSB, 2011b). 
When the NTSB added GA Safety to its Most Wanted List, it noted that the causes of 
current GA accidents continued to repeat the causes of historical GA accidents (NTSB, 
2012).  
Meanwhile, the GA pilot population has been shrinking. There were 532,177 
active pilots in 2000, compared to 494,177 active pilots in 2011 (NTSB, 2011a). The 
number of pilot certificates issued annually declined for all certificate categories. For 
example, private pilot certificates issued declined from 27,223 in 2000 to 13,457 in 2010 
(General Aviation Manufacturers Association [GAMA], 2011). Commercial certificates 
issued declined from 11,813 in 2000 to 5,774 in 2010 (GAMA, 2011).  
The NTSB noted an overall decline in the number of hours flown in GA since 
2000 (NTSB, 2011a). There was a sharp decline in hours flown from 2002 to 2003, likely 
because of the restrictions imposed on GA after the terrorist attacks in 2001. Whatever 
the reason, hours flown never recovered to pre-2001 levels and dropped sharply again 
from 2007 to 2009, most likely as a result of economic factors (NTSB, 2011a). Data 
collected by GAMA shows that the downward trends in GA activity since 2000 were a  
continuation of negative trends begun in preceding decades (2011).  
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ERAU student pilots. Enrollment at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University’s 
Daytona Beach campus was 4,496 in fall of 2010 (“Enrollment,” 2012). The student body 
included 1,101 students enrolled in the B.S. of Aeronautical Science degree program and 
275 enrolled in the B.S. of Aeronautics degree program; these two degree programs 
included all of ERAU’s flight students (“Enrollment,” 2012). International students from 
99 foreign countries made up 14% of the Daytona Beach campus population (“Student 
Demographics,” 2012). The average age of students at the Daytona Beach campus was 21 
years old, although some were as young as 16 and many students were in their 20s and 
30s (the population included many veterans, for example) (“Student Demographics,” 
2012). The population was mostly male, as is typical in the aviation industry; only 17% 
of the residential campus students were female (“Student Demographics,” 2012). 
Expert ADM 
Tradition associated good judgment so strongly with experience that aviation 
researchers based their definitions of good ADM on the ADM exhibited by an 
experienced – or expert – pilot.  
The novice pilot.  To define expert ADM, researchers first had to distinguish 
between novice and expert pilots. The term novice pilot has been used differently by 
various researchers to describe a relatively inexperienced pilot. Beringer and 
Schvaneveldt (2002) categorized pilots as novice or experienced by using overall flight 
time as a measure of experience, which is a traditional but flawed measurement. Deitch 
(2001) used novice pilot and student pilot, a person training to become a private pilot, 
synonymously.  Kobus, Procter, Bank, and Holste (2000) defined novice and expert by 
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measuring their population sample against itself; the median experience level was used as 
the break point between novice and expert.  
Other researchers distinguished novices from experts based on mental 
capabilities. Wiggins and O’Hare (2003) distinguished novice pilots from expert pilots 
according to “individual differences […] in their capacity to recognize and respond 
appropriately to deteriorating […] conditions” and further qualified expert pilots by 
saying “experts outperform novices in the capacity to acquire information” (p. 337-338). 
Endsley and Garland (2000) described differences in SA between groups of pilots with 
different experience levels. They compared GA pilots (approximately 720 hours 
experience) to airline pilots (approximately 6,000 hours experience) and to commercial 
airline check airmen (approximately 12,000 hours experience). They reported that more 
experienced pilots demonstrated increasing levels of preflight preparation and more focus 
on understanding and projection – more effective SA that enabled more successful ADM. 
Endsley and Garland concluded that SA training that addresses SA problems typical of 
low-experience GA pilots should be effective at improving SA and therefore ADM.  
The accident-prone pilot.  Understanding expert ADM also required research on 
faulty ADM, such as the ADM that causes a pilot to have an accident. Adams, Hamilton, 
Koonce, and Hwoschinsky (2002) completed a study that analyzed surveys from 4,000 
pilots to develop an index that could classify a pilot as high-risk or accident-prone. Their 
index was successful at predicting whether a pilot within their population sample had an 
accident or not (their population sample included pilots who had an accident and control 
pilots whose records were accident-free). In developing the index, they were able to 
characterize the ADM styles of both accident-prone and accident-free pilots. They 
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concluded that high-risk or accident-prone pilots were more likely to “expose themselves 
to unsafe flying experiences, feel time pressure when making decisions, have a false 
sense of their ability to handle the situation, and not review alternative options or 
solutions” (Adams et al., 2002, p. 948). 
An NTSB review of GA accidents led to a profile of GA pilots most likely to have 
accidents (Endsley & Garland, 2000). The greatest number of accidents involved “pilots 
between 35 to 39 years of age with between 100 to 499 hours total time who were 
engaged in personal flying” (Wells, 1992, as cited in Endsley & Garland, 2000, p. 2). 
Within the period from 100 to 499 hours total time, pilots with about 100 hours total time 
or who were 50 to100 hours beyond the private-pilot certification or instrument-rating 
were particularly accident-prone. Pilots who were recently certificated tended to 
overestimate their capabilities and put themselves in riskier situations (Trollip & Jensen, 
1991, as cited in Endsley & Garland, 2000). Endsley and Garland concluded that GA 
pilots who fit this profile were particularly receptive to, and especially needful of, 
specialized SA and ADM training. 
Although the typical accident-pilot profile described a low-time private pilot who 
may or may not hold an instrument rating, pilots with additional flight time and 
certificates made up a significant percentage of accident pilots. Of the non-commercial 
fixed-wing GA accidents in 2009, 24% involved commercial pilots and 13% involved 
ATPs (AOPA, 2010). A CFI was on board in 21% of those accidents (AOPA, 2010). 
Lethality of accidents was relatively constant for all levels of pilot certification involved 
in non-commercial fixed-wing accidents, with the exception of student pilots whose 
lethality rate was about one-quarter that of the other certification levels (AOPA, 2010). 
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Of the non-commercial helicopter GA accidents in 2009, 63% involved commercial 
pilots, 13% involved ATPs, and a CFI was on board in 51% of those accidents (AOPA, 
2010). 
ADM Training 
Using expert ADM as the goal for new ADM training programs, researchers 
examined traditional ADM training methods. Researchers developed new ADM training 
programs that focused on behavior management and on a combination of problem-
solving skills and practice. 
Traditional ADM training: informal by-product of experience.  Aviation first 
realized the extent of pilots’ weaknesses in decision-making, communication, and 
coordination when cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders were first used in 
accident investigations in the 1970s (Diehl, 1992). This discovery prompted the FAA and 
industry to develop formal decision-making training programs. At the time, civilian flight 
training remained unchanged from the CPT program implemented in advance of World 
War Two (Wright, 2009). The CPT training program was maneuvers-based with 
eligibility for certification defined by performance of those maneuvers within minimum 
standards and accumulation of minimum amounts of training time. Completion of 
training meant passing the FAA’s knowledge and practical tests (Diehl, 1992). Judgment 
was expected to develop as a natural by-product of experience after the check ride 
(Jensen, 1982). Many studies revealed a correlation between experience and higher 
quality decision-making (Schriver, Morrow, Wickens, & Taulleur, 2008).   
Adams (1992b) explained how ADM was thought to develop in traditional flight 
training. Traditional training through experience enabled pilots to develop problem-
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solving ability first by applying rote procedures to handle a situation that had been 
covered in training (Adams, 1992b). Novice pilots then developed a store of procedural 
knowledge from encountering real-world problems and operational constraints (Adams, 
1992b). After 1,000 to 10,000 hours, an expert pilot could apply responses quickly, based 
on similar past experiences and could begin to integrate knowledge learned from past 
experiences into solutions to solve novel situations (Adams, 1992b). 
Despite a correlation between improved ADM and increasing flight experience, 
experience alone had not been proven as the most effective method for acquiring 
judgment. Scholarly research and accident statistics showed that a significant percentage 
of accidents involved pilots with higher certifications and more experience (AOPA, 
2010). Training ADM informally as a by-product of experience was no longer adequate, 
as evidenced by accident investigations and statistics (Diehl, 1992).   
Industry researchers began developing formal ADM training programs. Gaining 
judgment through experience required time, money, and exposure to the very situations in 
which pilots need good decision-making skills to maintain safety of flight (Molesworth, 
Wiggins, & O’Hare, 2006). As Jensen (1982) stated, without decision-making training, 
“it is but a slight overstatement to say that good pilot judgment is learned by the lucky 
and the cautious over many years of varied flying experience” (p. 61).  
ADM: behavior management. Formal ADM training in all segments of aviation 
began from the theoretical foundations of behavior management and management theory. 
Early research on ADM emphasized changing pilot attitudes (Kochan, Jensen, Chubb, & 
Hunter, 1997). Researchers thought of faulty ADM as a result of misplaced motivation or 
a psychological factor in the pilot. GA ADM training materials therefore focused on 
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making pilots aware of hazardous attitudes and management of stress and risks (Kochan 
et al., 1997).  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the FAA published six manuals and an advisory 
circular to provide official guidance on GA ADM training. These documents were based 
on more than twelve years of research, development, and testing, and they represented the 
first formal effort to provide guidance on formal ADM training (FAA, 1991). These 
materials became the standard on which ADM training was based for a significant period 
of time.  
The focus on behavior management was consistent and evident throughout. For 
example, the ADM manual for student and private pilots called Aeronautical Decision 
Making for Student and Private Pilots stated that its purpose was to explain the risks 
associated with flying, the behavioral causes of typical accidents, and the impact of stress 
on decision making (Diehl, Hwochinsky, Lawton, & Livack, 1987). 
The remaining FAA manuals were aimed at GA pilots at different levels of 
training. Besides student and private pilots, the other manuals were designed for 
instrument pilots, commercial pilots, instructor pilots, helicopter pilots, and pilots 
working in multi-pilot crew environments (Adams & Thompson, 1987; Bush, Lawton, & 
Livack, 1987; Jensen, 1989; Jensen & Adrion, 1988; Jensen, Adrion, & Lawton, 1987). 
Each rating-specific manual explained the risks associated with that specific type of 
flying activities. They then described the “underlying behavioral causes” of judgment 
error and the effects of stress on decision making. They emphasized managing the pilot’s 
behavior and stress as a way to avoid unnecessary risk (Adams & Thompson, 1987; Bush 
et al., 1987; Diehl et al., 1987; Jensen, 1989; Jensen & Adrion, 1988; Jensen et al., 1987). 
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Teaching exercises included helping the student assess their own hazardous attitudes and 
identifying the hazardous attitudes exhibited by pilots who had accidents (Adams & 
Thompson, 1987; Bush et al., 1987; Diehl et al., 1987; Jensen, 1989; Jensen & Adrion, 
1988; Jensen et al., 1987). Finally, the manuals directed instructors to teach better 
judgment by exposing students to flight situations drawn from actual accidents and 
incidents, asking the students for input, and then giving feedback on the students’ 
responses (Jensen, 1989).  
Aeronautical Decision Making began by stating that “good judgment can be 
taught” (FAA, 1991, p. 1). The advisory circular’s stated purpose was to provide a 
“systematic approach to risk assessment and stress management in aviation, illustrate 
how personal attitudes can influence decision making and how those attitudes can be 
modified to enhance safety” (FAA, 1991, p. i). The document described hazardous 
attitudes and stress before outlining exercises to help students identify hazardous attitudes 
in others and assess themselves.  
The advisory circular provided a list of ADM definitions that have become 
industry standard (FAA, 1991). The advisory circular also described the DECIDE model, 
a six step, continuously looping process intended to give pilots a logical way to approach 
decision making. The six steps of DECIDE were: detect, estimate, choose, identify, do, 
and evaluate (FAA, 1991). The IMSAFE Checklist was offered as a method for assessing 
the risks associated with a pilot’s personal state. IMSAFE stood for illness, medication, 
stress, alcohol, fatigue, and eating (FAA, 1991).  
The FAA also provided some specific aspects of ADM instruction. As with 
previous guidance, this document advocated discussing scenarios with the student to 
28 
 
ensure the student understood the hazardous attitudes (FAA, 1991).  There was a new 
emphasis on the flight instructor’s role in ADM training (a combination of role model, 
evaluator, and coach). The FAA said students needed to be exposed to ADM instruction 
earlier, and instructors needed to teach ADM in the air as well as on the ground. The 
flight instructor needed to create in-flight scenarios to “stimulate the student’s decision 
making process” and respond to student behavior in a way that encourages safe decision 
making (FAA, 1991, p. 28).  
The effectiveness of the FAA’s manuals was validated in multiple independent 
studies where student pilots received training in accordance with the manuals along with 
a standard flying curriculum (FAA, 1991). Pilots in empirical studies made significantly 
fewer in-flight errors after receiving ADM training; the reduction in judgment errors 
ranged from 10% to 50% (FAA, 1991). Pilots in an operational study at Petroleum 
Helicopter Inc. demonstrated a 54% reduction in overall accident rate after receiving 
recurrent training in accordance with the FAA’s ADM manuals (Diehl, 1992; FAA, 
1991).  
Although the effectiveness of the ADM training described in the FAA’s guidance 
was validated by several studies, formal ADM training was not effectively integrated into 
GA training. The FAA had provided guidance on ADM training but did not alter the 
testing standards or certification methods to clearly define satisfactory ADM. Satisfactory 
performance continued to be defined in terms of minimum knowledge, proficiency, and 
aeronautical experience (Wright, 2002). With no clear standard for certification and no 
motivation, GA training continued to “teach to the test” instead of using formal ADM 
training.  
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ADM: problem-solving skills and practice. Accident rates in GA plateaued 
during the 1990s (Wright, 2002). The ultimate goal of ADM training was to improve GA 
safety by reducing the occurrence of decision error accidents. Researchers interpreted the 
lack of improvement in accident rates as an indication that current ADM training was 
having little measurable impact on GA safety. This conclusion led to analyses of the 
current ADM training materials and investigations into how to improve and better 
implement ADM training methodologies. Research about ADM began to focus on ADM 
as a problem-solving skill set, and began to emphasize practicing problem-solving in 
ADM training instead of attitude management (Adams, 1992a; Adams, 1992b; Irving, 
1992; Ericsson, 1992).  
Many researchers presented their findings on existing ADM training at the FAA’s 
ADM Workshop in 1992 (Adams & Adams, 1992).  Adams (1992b) described the 
judgment that expert pilots exhibited as composed of a “variety of different processing 
skills and unique problem solving capabilities” (p. 110). He criticized the applicability of 
the ADM training manuals developed by the FAA described above, saying that they 
taught an algorithmic, linear process of methodical decision-making which did not 
resemble the way experts actually made decisions when in emergency or stressful 
conditions (Adams, 1992b).   
Adams (1992b) suggested several alternative training methods. Activity-based 
learning would engage flight students in real-world problems while in the training 
environment, allowing students to gain experience in a controlled manner. Exercises and 
discussions on SA based on vignettes would help students practice maintaining their SA 
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(Adams, 1992b). Interactive computer or video training devices would be useful in 
creating realistic activities (Adams, 1992b). 
In another presentation, How Expert Pilots Think, Adams (1992a) revisited the 
role of experience in developing problem-solving skills in contemporary ADM training. 
He observed that practice was the most important variable in determining the level of 
expertise an individual achieved in non-aviation domains (Adams, 1992a). Flying 
experience was important in helping develop a pilot’s base of knowledge and procedural 
responses in that the practice enabled faster pattern recognition, problem perception, and 
more efficient problem solving (Adams, 1992a). Real-life flying rarely presented 
opportunities to practice problem-solving, though, which suggested that pilots need ADM 
training that provides more opportunity to practice those skills in order to gain expertise 
(Adams, 1992a). 
Irving (1992) also emphasized ADM as a complex problem-solving process.  He 
criticized the traditional ADM training method, which consisted primarily of on-the-job 
training. Such training was restricted to the type of normal, day-to-day occurrences that 
did not require advanced ADM skills. Random instead of structured, traditional ADM 
training was not formalized in such a way as to ensure all the important skills were 
covered (Irving, 1992).  
Irving (1992) also criticized first-generation ADM training for relying too heavily 
on formulaic procedures. Pilots were being trained to simply apply the procedure instead 
of exploring alternative solutions (Irving, 1992). Performance was measured through 
observation of easily measured motor skills and on how accurately the procedure was 
applied, rather than valid measurements of ADM (Irving, 1992). Programs provided little 
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or no guidance in acquiring data acquisition skills (Irving, 1992). Finally, training was 
not being provided by expert decision-makers or based on input from subject matter 
experts (Irving, 1992). 
Irving (1992) suggested that ADM training programs incorporate structured 
scenarios instead. Effective scenarios had to be realistic, ideally drawn from observations 
of more experienced pilots (Irving, 1992). Scenarios would establish training objectives 
beforehand and include a full debriefing afterwards (Irving, 1992). Using scenarios 
would create opportunity for practicing the process of evaluating and solving dangerous 
situations and review alternate solutions while safely in a hangar (Irving, 1992). 
Ericsson’s (1992) presentation, Methodology for Studying and Training Expertise, 
echoed the points made by Adams (1992a; 1992b) and Irving (1992). Ericsson (1992) 
described expert decision making in aviation as a set of critical skills including 
evaluation, correlation, and application of relevant memories. Deliberate practice was 
necessary to acquire and maintain expert performance in aviation, just as in other 
domains where expert performance was observed such as competitive sports and 
medicine (Ericsson, 1992).  
The researchers who gathered for the Workshop on Aeronautical Decision Making 
formulated an action plan to improve ADM training effectiveness (Adams & Adams, 
1992). The plan identified several key participants within the federal government, 
industry, and academia (Adams & Adams, 1992). The plan identified four major tasks 
that needed to be accomplished in order to improve overall effectiveness of ADM 
training. Those tasks were to define the structure of decision making tasks, develop 
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training requirements, specify training strategies, and evaluate training effectiveness 
(Adams & Adams, 1992).  
Problem-based learning. Several ADM training strategies were created and 
tested after the Workshop on Aeronautical Decision Making (Adams & Adams, 1992). 
The conceptualization of ADM as a set of problem-solving skills (rather than the result of 
a behavior or motivation problem) led many aviation researchers to investigate adapting 
problem-solving strategies that had been developed in other fields to aviation. One such 
strategy was called problem-based learning (PBL). 
Medical researchers at McMaster University School of Medicine pioneered the 
PBL approach to teaching and curriculum design in 1966 (FAA, 2008). PBL was defined 
as lessons structured to confront students with real-world problems and force them to 
reach realistic solutions by practicing problem-solving skills (FAA, 2008). Variations of 
PBL included SBT, collaborative problem-solving, and case study (FAA, 2008). SBT 
used a highly structured script based on real-world experiences to “address aviation 
training objectives in an operational environment” (FAA, 2008, p. 4-16). Collaborative 
problem-solving engaged multiple students in collaborative problem-solving discussions 
guided by an instructor (FAA, 2008). In case study training, the instructor presented an 
account of a real world situation that illustrated a point and then prompted the students to 
analyze the case, develop possible solutions, and come to conclusions (FAA, 2008).  
Commercial and military training implementation. Forms of problem-solving 
learning were adopted by the commercial and military aviation sectors after attending a 
1979 workshop hosted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 
Participants learned that the majority of human errors that led to accidents were failures 
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of decision making, leadership, and communications (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 
1999). Commercial airlines and military leadership left the workshop determined to 
create training programs to prevent these errors. Such programs were strikingly popular 
and evolved rapidly in an innovative and collaborative environment (Helmreich & 
Foushee, 2010). 
 Commercial airlines created training programs to “enhance interpersonal aspects 
of flight operations” (Helmreich et al., 1999, p. 1). These programs were known as crew 
resource management (CRM) training programs (Diehl, 1992). United Airlines developed 
the first comprehensive U.S. CRM program (Helmreich et al., 1999). KLM developed a 
leadership training program, while Northwest pioneered Line Orientated Flight Training 
(LOFT), a form of SBT which modeled each training session after a real-life, or “line”, 
flight (Diehl, 1992). Most CRM programs evolved to include training manuals, 
interactive classroom discussions, and LOFT sessions (Diehl, 1992).  
CRM programs proved to be very effective at reducing pilot error in air carrier 
operations. A case-series analysis of crashes and other mishaps of domestic air carrier 
flights (operating under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 121), both 
scheduled and nonscheduled, that occurred during 1983 – 2002 revealed several 
encouraging trends (Baker, Qiang, Rebok, & Li, 2008). The proportion of mishaps 
involving pilot error decreased from 42% in 1983-1987 to 25% in 1998-2002 (Baker et 
al., 2008). Mishap rates related to poor decision making decreased from 6.2 to 1.8 per 10 
million flights, and mishap rates involving poor crew interaction declined from 2.8 to 0.9 
per 10 million flights (Baker et al., 2008). Baker et al. (2008) credited these 
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improvements to air carriers’ emphasis on CRM as well as improving technology such as 
cockpit displays. 
The U.S. Air Force Military Airlift Command (now Air Mobility Command) and 
the U.S. Naval Safety Center pioneered Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT), the 
military equivalent of CRM programs (Diehl, 1992). ACT programs were designed to 
improve decision making as well as communications within military cockpits and 
between crews and outside contacts (O’Conner, Hahn, & Nullmeyer, 2010). ACT 
programs remained largely unchanged in the 1980s, but military-funded research in the 
early 1990s led to advances in CRM training effectiveness (O’Conner et al., 2010). By 
2010, the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard all utilized CRM 
training programs (O’Conner et al., 2010). Many non-U.S. military services had 
implemented a CRM program by 2010 too (O’Conner et al., 2010). Recent research 
evaluated the effectiveness of SBT-based CRM training in the People’s Republic of 
China Air Force (Li & Harris, 2005, 2008).  
Li and Harris published a study in 2005 that evaluated the suitability of various 
ADM mnemonics for resolving different types of decision-making scenarios. The 
researchers asked instructor pilots (IPs) in the Chinese Air Force Academy to rate the 
suitability of the following ADM methods: SHOR (Stimuli, Hypotheses, Options, 
Response), PASS (Problem identiﬁcation, Acquire information, Survey strategy, Select 
strategy), FOR-DEC (Facts, Options, Risks & Beneﬁts, Decision, Execution, Check), 
SOAR (Situation, Options, Act, Repeat); and DESIDE (Detect, Estimate, Set safety 
objectives, Identify, Do, Evaluate). The IPs favored two of the mnemonics depending on 
how much time was available to make a decision; the IPs judged SHOR to be the best 
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method for time-limited decisions while DESIDE was deemed more suitable for 
decisions that were less time-limited and required more comprehensive thinking (Li and 
Harris, 2005). 
Li and Harris (2008) later created and tested an ADM training program that they 
administered to a group of Chinese Tactical Training Wing pilots. Half of the participants 
received Li and Harris’ ADM training course while the other half did not. All of the 
participants then completed simulated flights in a full-flight simulator where the 
participants’ decision-making skills were evaluated with respect to situation assessment, 
risk management, and response time. Those pilots who received the ADM training 
exhibited significant improvements in the quality of their situation assessment and risk 
management, although response time was negatively impacted. Li and Harris (2008) 
concluded that their ADM training program was effective in improving decision making 
and that ADM was trainable. 
GA training research. Several forms of PBL were tested in GA settings as well. 
O’Hare, Mullen, and Arnold completed a study in 2009 testing the effectiveness of case-
based reflection. O’Hare et al. (2009) gathered a sample of non-pilots, and provided 
different ADM training to groups of test subjects. All of the subjects read case studies 
where a pilot encountered adverse weather. Half of the subjects read cases where the pilot 
successfully dealt with the conditions and landed safely while the other half read cases 
where the pilot crashed. After reading the case studies, half of the subjects participated in 
a reflective thinking exercise while the other half merely recalled as much detail as 
possible about the cases. They then flew a simulated flight on a computer-based flight 
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simulator and had to decide when (or if) to discontinue a flight as the researchers 
gradually made the weather conditions deteriorate (O’Hare, et al., 2009).  
Those participants who reflected on the cases stopped the flight sooner, when the 
weather had not deteriorated as far, than those who merely recalled the cases (O’Hare, et 
al., 2009).  Several participants who merely recalled the cases failed to discontinue the 
flight and crashed into terrain. The outcome of the cases did not have a significant impact 
on the participants’ decision making. These results led the researchers to conclude that 
reflecting on cases improved ADM with respect to recognition of critical weather 
situations and adherence to relevant regulations. Whether the cases studied resulted in 
success or a crash did not seem to have any significance. Although the researchers 
intentionally selected participants who were not pilots, the apparent improvement in 
decision-making as a result of reflection demonstrated the utility of case-based training 
for ADM (O’Hare et al., 2009). 
Lee, Fanjoy, and Dillman (2005) examined the effects of regular exposure to 
safety information on the ADM capacity of students in a collegiate flight program. The 
study focused on ADM involved in mechanical malfunction scenarios. The researchers 
took three measurements of the participants’ ADM: recognition time, response time, and 
appropriateness of response (Lee et al., 2005). The population consisted of undergraduate 
students who had received their private pilot certificate and were training for a 
commercial pilot certificate. The experimental group of students received online access to 
a safety information system that compiled aircraft discrepancies; the experimental group 
also received online prompts to review the information in the safety information system 
before each of their routine training flights over a five-week period. The results showed a 
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measurable improvement in recognition time, response time, and appropriateness of 
response in experimental participants compared to the control participants (Lee et al., 
2005). The study findings therefore supported the hypothesis that regular exposure to 
safety information improves ADM (Lee et al., 2005). 
ADM mnemonics and acronyms. Operators used many mnemonics and 
acronyms to help pilots remember CRM, ADM, and Single Pilot Resource Management 
(SRM) concepts. Some examples included FATE, which summarized the basic steps in 
the ADM process: Fly the aircraft; Assess the situation; Take appropriate action; Evaluate 
the results (Sumwalt & Watson, 1995). The FAA developed other mnemonics for ADM 
including the Three-P (3P) model. According to the 3P model, the pilot applied ADM by 
perceiving the current flight circumstances, processing the significance of those 
circumstances, and performing the best course of action [emphasis added] (FAA, 2008a).  
Other ADM mnemonics included SHOR, PASS, FOR-DEC, SOAR, and DESIDE 
(Li & Harris, 2005). The FAA promoted the IMSAFE and PAVE checklists to help pilots 
manage risk (FAA, 2008a). IMSAFE evaluated personal risk factors, as described 
previously; PAVE divided flight risks into four categories of “Pilot in command, Aircraft, 
enVironment, and External pressures” (FAA, 2008a, p. 9-6). The Five Ps (5 Ps) was 
another commonly used memory aid for evaluating the risk of a flight. The 5 Ps consisted 
of “the Plan, the Plane, the Pilot, the Passengers, and the Programming” (FAA, 2008a, p. 
9-13).   
Implementing GA ADM Training 
Formal ADM training still had not been widely implemented in GA as recently as 
2009 although PBL-based ADM training programs were implemented decades earlier by 
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commercial and military operators (Wright, 2009). Implementation of CRM, LOFT, and 
Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) at commercial carriers resulted in significant 
improvements in decision-related accident rates and in overall pilot error rates (Baker et 
al., 2008; Wright, 2009). In contrast, accident statistics show that pilot-error accident 
rates for GA improved very little during the 1990s and remained unchanged during the 
past decade (AOPA, 2009; AOPA, 2010). 
The lack of measurable improvement in decision error rates and in overall 
accident rates in GA prompted escalating responses from the FAA, industry, and 
academia from the late 1990s on. The FAA formed CGAR and founded the FITS 
program. These programs involved increasingly collaborative efforts between the FAA 
and industry representatives such as manufacturers and operators, and educational 
institutions to develop consensus-based standards. The FAA also published revised 
guidance on ADM training – emphasizing the use of SBT – in new versions of several 
manuals and practical test standards (PTS) between 2008 and 2011 (FAA, 2008a; FAA, 
2008b; FAA, 2010a; FAA, 2010b; FAA, 2011a; FAA, 2011b). 
FAA CGAR. The FAA founded CGAR in 2001 (CGAR, 2011). Aviation 
universities including ERAU, University of Alaska, University of North Dakota (UND), 
and Wichita State University coordinated through CGAR to support industry and FAA 
research goals. CGAR’s mission is to “make significant contributions toward 
improvements in safety and efficiency for GA air transportation […] with 
multidisciplinary teams to enhance aviation related research, education, technology 
transfer and the utilization of research in mission critical areas” (CGAR, 2011, p. 1).  
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FITS. The FAA launched the FITS program under the Safer Skies program in 
2002 (“FAA-Industry Training Standards [FITS] Program Plan,” 2003). There was 
growing support to “train the way you will fly (in the real world) and fly the way you 
were trained” in GA (Wright, 2002, p. 10). The overall goals of the FITS program were 
to identify changing training needs and develop standards based on industry consensus 
that responded to the pace of development in GA (“FAA-Industry Training Standards 
[FITS] Program Plan,” 2003). FITS aimed to create scenario-based, learner-focused 
training materials that would produce pilots with more practical knowledge and skills 
than traditional training provided (“FAA-Industry Training Standards [FITS] Program 
Plan,” 2003). Supporting goals included developing a new GSC infrastructure to support 
reforms in GA training (“FAA-Industry Training Standards [FITS] Program Plan,” 2003).  
Initial members of FITS included the FAA, CGAR, and industry leaders such as 
Eclipse Aviation, Adam Aircraft, Cessna Aircraft, and Elite Air Center (“FAA-Industry 
Training Standards [FITS] Program Plan,” 2003). An oversight committee composed of 
FAA and industry members oversaw the FITS program plan, goals, methodology, 
schedule, and tasking (“FAA-Industry Training Standards [FITS] Program Plan,” 2003). 
The FAA also created a FITS Work Group which evaluated the products FITS delivered, 
and developed recommended training programs and guidance (“FAA-Industry Training 
Standards [FITS] Program Plan,” 2003).   
The FAA-Industry Training Standards [FITS] Program Plan (2003) explained 
reasons to reform the existing GSC in GA. Existing GSC was comprised of advisory 
circulars, handbooks, PTS, and other materials such as the ADM manuals described 
above (Adams & Thompson, 1987; Bush et al., 1987; Diehl et al., 1987; Jensen, 1989; 
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Jensen & Adrion, 1988; Jensen et al., 1987). FITS researchers doubted whether many GA 
training operators used the existing GSC at all (“FAA-industry,” 2003). Many documents 
were so out-of-date as to be obsolete (“FAA-industry,” 2003). Revising these documents 
was a lengthy process and the FAA had no method for managing the GSC’s currency 
(“FAA-industry,” 2003). The accelerating pace at which technology was modernizing 
GA aircraft, navigation, and airspace only aggravated GSC’s inflexibility. Other GSC 
material was incomplete. The GSC material that was current was oriented towards 
teaching to the knowledge and practical tests rather than developing ADM, SA and other 
HOTS through an SBT and performance-based testing approach (“FAA-industry,” 2003). 
As it was, the GSC prevented a reform of the GA training paradigm because it 
maintained the current maneuver-based training (MBT) paradigm (Wright, 2002). 
The overall goals of the FITS program were to identify changing training needs 
and develop industry standards that responded to the pace of development in GA and 
were based on industry consensus (“FAA-industry,” 2003). Supporting goals included 
developing a new GSC infrastructure to support reforms in GA training (“FAA-industry,” 
2003). FITS was not intended as a regulatory mechanism, rather, the goal has been to 
create safer pilots in less time by creating voluntary alternatives to regulatory-mandated 
training (Glista, 2003). Possible applications included an FAA-approved proficiency 
program and aircraft or equipment specific training that would lower insurance premiums 
(Glista, 2003).  
Researchers at FITS universities conducted studies to investigate the effectiveness 
of FITS training. A study conducted at ERAU in the fall of 2004 compared collegiate 
students training towards an instrument rating in traditional MBT to students who were 
41 
 
instructed using SBT (French, Blickensderfer, Ayers, & Connolly, 2005). The population 
sample was 27 ERAU students training for the instrument rating. The researchers 
randomly assigned the participants to the control (MBT) or experimental (SBT) groups. 
All participants received eight hours of training before the final evaluation. An 
experimentally blind rater evaluated the participants’ instrument flight skills using a 
computer-based flight simulator program on pre- and post-training “data collection 
flight[s]” (French et al., 2005). Both MBT and SBT trained students showed significant 
improvements between the pre- and post-test measures. Furthermore, the SBT group 
performed statistically better on many measures of piloting ability than the MBT group in 
the post-test measures. The results suggested that SBT may improve instrument flight 
rules (IFR) piloting and navigation skills over traditional MBT in a TAA aircraft (French 
et al., 2005).  
UND conducted a study that compared the effectiveness of SBT in teaching 
HOTS and decision making to traditional aviation instruction and self-study (Robertson, 
Petros, Schumacher, McHorse, & Ulrich, 2006). The study used 45 undergraduate UND 
students, divided into three groups (Robertson et al., 2006). All participants were upper-
level undergraduate students who were qualified to fly at least one other single-engine 
piston aircraft (Robertson et al., 2006). The SBT-trained group was trained using 
transition training that UND researchers had previously designed for Cirrus Aircraft to 
transition pilots into the Cirrus SR22; PBL was incorporated into both ground and flight 
instruction (Robertson et al., 2006).  The self-study group used the Cirrus SR 22 Pilot’s 
Operating Handbook (POH) and CD-ROM-based training materials; their instruction 
consisted of being presented with scenarios and asked to research the POH to find a 
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solution for the scenarios (Robertson et al., 2006). The alternate treatment group was 
used as a control and received non-PBL instruction and MBT similar to traditional 
transition training (Robertson et al., 2006).  
Pre- and post-training sessions conducted in a simulator provided the data to 
evaluate the participants’ aircraft control, pilot performance, SA, and ADM (Robertson et 
al., 2006). Eight research assistants either possessed a CFI certificate or received training 
to conduct the evaluations. The research assistants also provided the ground and flight 
training, then evaluated the students that the other assistants had trained (Robertson et al., 
2006). The results indicated significant improvements in measurements of judgment and 
ADM, SA, and automation management ability (Robertson et al., 2006). None of the 
differences were statistically significant, though, so the study had difficulty supporting a 
shift in GA training from MBT to SBT (Robertson et al., 2006). The study did not 
identify any weaknesses of FITS training as implemented in the study (Robertson et al., 
2006). 
The FITS program’s emphasis on higher-order skills such as enhanced decision 
making and single-pilot resource management represented a significant departure from 
the established MBT philosophy. As Wright (2011) discussed, the intention behind FITS 
was to reform the old training paradigm to better train GA pilots to deal with current 
safety issues. FITS research, such as the studies discussed above, validated the 
effectiveness of SBT in GA training and the effectiveness of collaboration between the 
FAA and industry. Other FITS studies verified that FITS SBT training was high quality 
and participants were very satisfied (Robertson & Summers, 2007). Despite the FITS 
program’s validation of SBT, progress on reforming the GA training paradigm to 
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conform with SBT instead of traditional MBT moved slowly (Wright, 2011). Wright 
(2009) asserted that reform needed in GA would not happen without industry leadership. 
Reforms to GSC have moved slowly too. More explicit standards for ADM were 
included in the last revisions of several PTS; the Instrument Rating PTS and Certified 
Flight Instructor, Instrument Rating PTS were revised in 2010 (FAA, 2010a; FAA, 
2010b). The Private PTS and Commercial PTS were revised to include similar, explicit 
standards for ADM and an emphasis on using SBT to evaluate applicants, effective June 
2012 (FAA, 2011a; FAA, 2011b). The FAA also included extensive material on SBT, 
SA, and SRM in the latest version of the Aviation Instructor’s Handbook (FAA, 2008a) 
and discussed ADM in the latest version of the Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical 
Knowledge (FAA, 2008b).  
Continuing the GA Training Reform Initiative 
GA safety and training were still a significant issue in 2012. The NTSB added GA 
Safety to its Most Wanted List in 2011 (NTSB, 2011c). The NTSB also hosted a forum, 
General Aviation Safety: Climbing to the Next Level, in June 2012 to raise awareness of 
GA safety issues, promote discussions, and determine effective actions to be taken 
(NTSB, 2012). Industry organizations such as AOPA, GAMA, and SAFE plus many 
individual researchers have expressed concerns over the sustainability of GA if accident 
rates are not improved (GAMA, 2010; SAFE, 2011b; Wright, 2009).   
Continuing the GA training reform required active leadership from industry 
groups to promote the implementation of new training methods (Wright, 2011).  SAFE is 
an industry group that has played an important role in coordinating the GA training 
reform since it formed in 2009. SAFE is an organization of aviation educators “fostering 
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professionalism and excellence in aviation through continuing education, professional 
standards, and accreditation” (“About SAFE,” 2012). SAFE’s Mission Statement states 
that they seek to “create a safer environment through enhanced education” (“Vision & 
Mission Statement,” 2012).  
SAFE held a Pilot Training Reform Symposium in May 2011 where members met 
to form a “consistent framework for reform” (SAFE, 2011a). Attendees included senior 
FAA personnel, decorated flight instructors, and many prominent industry representatives 
(Stowell, 2011). SAFE published a preliminary report soon after the symposium, 
detailing the projects that SAFE members recommended. Members supplied many 
suggestions at the Symposium to promote GA training reform. These suggestions were 
consolidated into the following six “actionable and specific projects”: 
1. Conduct a thorough general aviation fatal accident root cause analysis to 
pinpoint underlying accident causality as a means to create effective remedial 
actions. 
2. Create a new flight review option that can be enabled as an FAA-sponsored 
pilot proficiency award program. 
3. Revise FAA doctrine and standards to implement scenario-based testing, risk 
management, and other higher order pilot skills. 
4. Modify flight instructor doctrine, initial testing, and renewal procedures to 
include the teaching of higher order pilot skills. 
5. Implement voluntary flight instructor professional accreditation programs and 
continuing education that emphasize higher order pilot skills, scenario training, 
and interpersonal relationship skills. 
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6. Create and implement model curricula that incorporate higher order pilot skills, 
scenario-based training, and integration of simulation and other teaching 
methods to include interpersonal relationship skills. (SAFE, 2011a, p. 4, 10) 
 
The report designated a project lead, participating organizations, required actions, 
expected outcomes, and a proposed timeline for each of the projects (SAFE, 2011a). 
An update report, released in October of 2011, described the progress achieved 
since the Symposium (SAFE, 2011b). Limited progress had been made. For example, the 
FAA convened a Flight Training Standards Aviation Rulemaking Committee in late 2011 
to specifically address needed reforms in standards for airmen knowledge tests and PTS 
(SAFE, 2011b). Several courseware providers posted free online training syllabi within 
weeks of the symposium (SAFE, 2011b). The FAA also revitalized and reorganized the 
General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC), a committee composed of industry 
and FAA representatives that has existed but not provided much leadership for the past 
decade (SAFE, 2011b).  
The update report also voiced concerns. Training reforms remained vital to 
improve aviation safety and to promote growth (SAFE, 2011b). SAFE called for 
leadership, particularly from the FAA and the GAJSC, and from the bottom up through 
grassroots organizations (SAFE, 2011b). The report called on the FAA and industry to 
reach a consensus on the path to training reform (SAFE, 2011b). 
Summary  
The GA community incorporates a large and varied population, but has had a poor 
safety record compared to other aviation sectors. The number of active pilots, certificates 
issued, and hours flown all decreased in the last ten years, continuing the trend of the 
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preceding decades. Relevant subsets of the GA pilot population include novice pilots, 
accident-prone pilots, and ERAU student pilots. 
The concepts of judgment, ADM, HOTS, and SA were researched. Government, 
academia, and industry formed the first formal ADM training efforts, employing behavior 
management strategies to improve ADM. ADM training later evolved to emphasize 
problem-solving skills and practice. Researchers created and tested different forms of 
PBL, including SBT, collaborative problem-solving, and case study. Researchers also 
tested the effectiveness of various memory aids and mnemonics.  
ADM training became a cornerstone of the growing movement to reform GA 
training. The traditional MBT paradigm was no longer sufficient to improve ADM and 
HOTS in GA; training needed to shift to an SBT paradigm in order to effectively teach 
ADM and HOTS and improve GA’s safety record. Significant efforts to reform GA 
training into an SBT paradigm included CGAR, the FITS program, and SAFE.  
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Chapter III 
Methodology 
Research Approach 
This comparative study used the following experimental design. The population 
sample was divided into two groups – control and experimental – each with 15 
participants. The control group completed two SBT sessions in a Frasca Mentor 
Advanced Aviation Training Device (AATD) (Frasca International, Inc., 2010). The 
initial AATD session was used to establish the participants’ baseline ADM while the 
second AATD session revealed any change in the participants’ ADM. Like the control 
group, the experimental group completed two SBT sessions in an AATD to establish a 
baseline and then document any change in the participants’ ADM. The experimental 
group also received an ADM training treatment between the first and second SBT 
sessions. The researcher observed all of the AATD sessions, conducted the ADM training 
treatment, and scored the participants’ ADM, based on real-time observations and 
subsequent review of the sessions via video and audio recordings. 
Design and procedures.   
Designating the control and experimental groups. The study participants were 
divided into two groups. The participants’ names were entered into a computer program 
which randomly assigned a number to each participant. The participants were then 
organized according to his or her assigned number. Those participants with the lower 15 
numbers were designated the control group; those with the higher 15 numbers were 
designated the experimental group.   
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AATD session design. The study used four ADM scenarios to test the 
participants’ ADM in the AATD sessions. The four scenarios included a variety of 
different decisions that pilots realistically encounter on a visual flight rules (VFR) cross-
country flight. The variety of scenarios allowed enough possible combinations of first 
and second scenarios to avoid rehearsal effects. The scenarios were randomly chosen for 
each participant’s first AATD session. The scenario for that participant’s second AATD 
session was randomly selected from the remaining three scenarios.  
The researcher developed the four scenarios using personal experiences and 
stories from fellow flight instructors to generate points where the participant would need 
to make a decision. Personal knowledge of a typical ERAU flight student’s training also 
informed several design choices for the scenarios (simulation equipment used, planned 
route of flight, etc.). The dilemmas presented in each scenario were generic and designed 
to imitate a common human-error related accident cause.  
Each scenario simulated a VFR cross-country flight in a Cessna 172S NAV III 
Skyhawk (C172 Nav III) equipped with the Garmin G1000 avionics suite. The C172 Nav 
III is a single-engine propeller-driven aircraft with a 36-foot wingspan that can carry four 
people including the pilot. The C172 Nav III is the aircraft ERAU uses for all primary 
flight training. The Frasca Mentor AATD, installed at ERAU’s Daytona Beach campus, 
is modeled after the C172 Nav III. Using that Frasca Mentor allowed the researcher to put 
the participants, who were all ERAU flight students, into a familiar aircraft, eliminating 
any effect on performance caused by an unfamiliar aircraft. 
The route of flight departed from Southwest Florida International Airport 
(KRSW) near Naples, Florida and followed visual landmarks and Victor airways to 
49 
 
Hurlburt Field (KHRT) near Pensacola, FL. This route was chosen because it was far 
enough away from Daytona Beach to put students in unfamiliar territory but was still 
within the AATD’s geographical database.  
Each scenario began with the participant cruising in straight and level flight 
somewhere enroute. The starting location changed for each scenario. Otherwise, starting 
conditions were similar for all four scenarios. Appendix F shows the AATD Session 
Procedure for one of the scenarios which includes the initial conditions. While the 
scenario was in progress, a researcher assistant role-played as air traffic control and any 
other voices the participant would hear over the radio or in the cockpit. 
AATD session procedure. Each participant completed two AATD sessions, 
spaced several days apart. The procedure for the first and second AATD sessions was 
identical. Prior to entering the AATD, the researcher briefed each participant on the 
schedule for the session. The participant was provided with a Consent Form (see 
Appendix B) and a Pilot Briefing (see Appendix C). The participant was then provided 
with cross-country planning materials including a weight and balance form, a standard 
weather briefing, a completed flight plan, a completed navigation log, and VFR sectional 
charts and IFR low-altitude enroute charts covering the entire route. The participants 
were allowed as much time as they desired to review and organize the cross-country 
materials. 
When the participant was ready, the researcher guided them to the AATD and 
provided a notepad, pen, and an Airport Facility Directory (AFD). The researcher briefed 
the participant that he or she would start the simulation when ready by pushing a red 
button on the AATD’s instrument panel. Participants were instructed to fly the AATD as 
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if they were flying a real Cessna 172 on a real VFR cross-country flight. The researcher 
stated that she would tell the participant to end the scenario by pushing the red button 
when it was time. 
The researcher conducted a debrief at the end of each session, before the 
participant exited the AATD. The Debrief Form (see Appendix E) included several 
questions designed to assess the participant’s SA and the degree to which he or she used 
an ADM process. The debrief was not treated as data but assisted the researcher in 
scoring the participant’s ADM.  
Treatment design. The researcher designed the treatment, drawing guidance from 
the FAA’s Advisory Circular concerning ADM, Aeronautical Decision Making (FAA, 
1991), and from FITS materials including the FAA-Industry Training Standards (FITS) 
Program Plan (2003), FITS Master Instructor Syllabus (2006), and SRM Scenario 
(2009). The intent was to provide SBT to pilots in a classroom setting, thus accelerating 
the acquisition of higher-level decision-making skills. The treatment was divided into two 
phases: (a) inform the participants on ADM principles, strategies, and practical 
applications, and (b) guide the participants as they apply that information to a cross-
country flight scenario.  
The treatment was conducted in a conference-style classroom on ERAU’s 
Daytona Beach campus. The room was equipped with a single, long table where 
everyone sat. This arrangement allowed the participants to see and interact with each 
other, encouraging everyone’s involvement in the discussion.  
Treatment procedure. The treatment was delivered to the experimental group in 
groups of two to six participants between the participants’ first and second AATD 
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sessions. Each treatment session began with providing a Consent Form to each 
participant (see Appendix B). The researcher then delivered a short presentation on ADM 
principles, strategies, and practical applications using a PowerPoint® presentation as a 
visual aid. The expected outcomes of the treatment were that participants: 
 Accepted the importance of sound ADM 
 Understood that ADM must be active; the pilot in command  (PIC) must 
actively seek out decisions and then resolve them 
 Understood and used the 5Ps (Plan, Plane, Pilot, Passengers, Programming), 
IMSAFE (Illness, Medication, Stress, Alcohol, Fatigue, Eating), DECIDE 
(Detect, Estimate, Choose, Identify, Do, Evaluate), and FATE (Fly the 
airplane, Assess the situation, Take action, Evaluate) models to analyze a 
scenario.  
Next, the researcher guided the participants through a group discussion 
concerning a hypothetical cross-country flight. A PowerPoint presentation sourced from 
the FITS website (“SRM Scenario,” 2009) displayed relevant information about the flight 
while the researcher prompted the participants to apply the ADM information they had 
just received. Prompts included: 
 What is the status of the 5Ps now? 
 What are your concerns? 
 Do you have any decisions to make? Explain. 
 What actions could you take? 
 What resources could you use to help make this decision? 
 What action would you take? Why? 
52 
 
 What concerns do you have after you decided to …? 
The researcher ended the group session by recapping key points of the presentation, 
answering any lingering questions, and soliciting feedback on how useful the participants 
thought the session would be if it were integrated into ERAU’s regular flight training 
curriculum. 
Apparatus and materials. The AATD sessions were completed in a Frasca 
Mentor AATD (Frasca International, Inc., 2010) installed at ERAU’s Daytona Beach 
campus (see Figure 1). This AATD’s instrument panel included the G1000 integrated 
avionics suite, a popular example of an all-glass panel available in many GA TAAs. The 
G1000’s two liquid crystal displays (LCDs) replace the traditional six-pack flight 
instruments and separate navigation and avionics components into a larger, integrated 
format. With a functional understanding of how to operate it, the G1000 can dramatically 
improve a pilot’s SA by making flight information easier to scan and process (“Garmin 
G1000
®,” 2012). However, the G1000 can just as easily overwhelm a pilot who is 
unfamiliar with the system. Two video cameras installed on either side of the AATD and 
a portable audio recorder were used to record the sessions. 
The treatment was conducted in a conference-style classroom on ERAU’s 
Daytona Beach campus. The room was equipped with a single, long table. The researcher 
used a computer, a projector, and a hanging screen to display two PowerPoint 
presentations. The researcher used a whiteboard and markers to provide additional 
training material.  
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Figure 1, Frasca Mentor Advanced Aviation Training Device (AATD). 
 
 
 
Population Sample 
The population was collegiate flight students. Participants for this study were 
solicited by the researcher from the population of flight students at ERAU’s Daytona 
Beach campus. The researcher visited all fall 2011 sections of AS 321 Commercial Pilot 
Operations (ERAU’s commercial pilot ground lab) and one of the weekly meetings of 
Alpha Omicron Alpha, an aviation honor society. These two population subsets included 
approximately 170 students.  
The researcher gave a short presentation describing the study and its benefits, and 
then asked those interested to provide their contact information. Seventy students 
volunteered contact information. Many students stopped responding to emails, but 32 
remained in contact. The study thus began with a population sample of 32 active 
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participants. Two of those participants did not complete the last phase of the study, 
leaving the study with a final self-selected sample of 30 participants.  
Data Collection Device 
This study used one primary data collection device. The researcher used the 
Scoring Sheet (see Appendix D) to record observations of the participants and assign 
scores as they completed each AATD session. Scores were entered for each of the 
variables at each decision point in the session. Each ordinal variable was scored as a 1, 2, 
or 3. A score of 2 described a relatively wide range of behaviors and meant that the 
researcher judged the participant’s ADM to be adequate for the situation but not 
exceptional. A score of 1 meant that the researcher judged the participant’s ADM to be 
inadequate for the situation. A score of 3 meant that the researcher judged the 
participant’s ADM to be exceptionally good, not merely good enough. Later, the scores 
for each ordinal variable (Problem Comprehended, Projection, Decision Process Used, 
and Timely Manner) were averaged across all decision points to yield a session score for 
each variable. The session scores were then averaged to generate an Overall ADM score 
for that participant.  
For example, consider the scores received by Participant 1 in Appendix D, 
Sample Scoring Sheet. This sample shows scores that four generic participants could 
have received in the first AATD session. Participant 1 completed a session that involved 
three decision points. In Comprehension, Participant 1 received a score of 2 for the first 
decision point, a 1 for the second decision point, and a 2 for the third decision point. The 
researcher calculated that participant’s session score for Comprehension by averaging 
those three scores (2, 1, and 2) which results in a score of 1.67. The researcher averaged 
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the remaining ordinal scores to calculate a session score for Projection (1.67), Decision 
Process Used (1.67), and Timely Manner (2.00). The researcher then averaged the session 
scores (1.67, 1.67, 1.67, and 2.00) to calculate an Overall ADM score of 1.75. Nominal 
data (Problem Detected, Problem Resolved, and Safe Outcome) was aggregated and 
analyzed by group – control versus experimental.  
The researcher also used a Debrief Form (see Appendix E) to facilitate a guided 
debrief with the participant at the end of each AATD session. The debrief served two 
purposes: (a) the debrief was intended to maximize participants’ learning by guiding 
them through a review of the experiences and the decisions they just made, and (b) the 
debrief solicited the participants’ thoughts and impressions which provided valuable 
insight for the researcher and enabled more accurate scoring. 
Content validity and reliability. Content validity is an estimate of how well an 
instrument reflects the intended construct or domain of content (Howell et al., 2005). In 
this study, the researcher sought to assess ADM and designed a study to test for ADM 
skills. The process for determining content validity involved using experiential content 
validity experts (CFIs) and professional experts (aviation practitioners who were 
university professors). The content validity of the study was supported by the theory-
based constructs from the literature review on ADM.  The result was a study design that 
had content validity with greater relevance for the target population of pilots ranging 
from student pilots to apprentice flight instructors.  
Content reliability refers to whether an instrument will produce consistent results 
each time it is administered in the same setting to the same subject (George & Mallery, 
2011). The researcher determined content reliability by performing a series of 
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Chronbach’s alpha analyses, which measure an instrument’s internal consistency. The 
Chronbach’s alpha was measured for four subsets of data. The first measurement 
considered the ordinal variable scores for all participants in Round One, excluding their 
Overall ADM scores. The second analysis measured the consistency of the ordinal 
variable scores for all participants in Round Two, excluding their Overall ADM scores. 
The third analysis measured the consistency of all ordinal variable scores for all 
participants in Round One, including the Overall ADM scores; the last analysis measured 
the consistency of all ordinal variable scores for all participants in Round Two.  
Treatment of the Data 
Descriptive statistics.  The data collection device for this study, the Scoring 
Sheet, recorded the following variables: Problem Detected, Problem Comprehended, 
Projection, Decision Process Used, Problem Resolved, Timely Manner, and Safe 
Outcome (see Appendix D). Three variables (Problem Detected, Problem Resolved, and 
Safe Outcome) were nominal and were described in charts. Four variables (Problem 
Comprehended, Projection, Decision Process Used, and Timely Manner) were ordinal 
data and were described in tables depicting the mean, the standard deviation (SD), the 
minimum, the maximum, and the count (N).  
Reliability Testing. The researcher determined content reliability by performing 
a series of Chronbach’s alpha analyses. Chronbach’s alpha measures were performed 
including all of the ordinal values except for the Overall ADM scores. Then, Chronbach’s 
alpha measures were performed again for all of the ordinal values including the Overall 
ADM scores. 
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Hypothesis testing. Hypothesis testing was conducted in five stages. First, the 
participants’ baseline ADM performance was established by using Mann-Whitney tests to 
compare the scores for the control and the experimental groups in the first AATD 
session. Second, the participants’ ending ADM was tested by using Mann-Whitney tests 
to compare the scores for the control and the experimental groups in the second AATD 
session. Third, the change in the control group’s ADM was tested by using Wilcoxon 
tests to compare the control group’s scores from the first AATD sessions to their scores 
in the second AATD sessions. Fourth, the change in the experimental group’s ADM was 
tested by using Wilcoxon tests to compare the experimental group’s scores from the first 
AATD sessions to their scores from the second AATD sessions. Fifth, Mann-Whitney 
tests were used to compare the Delta, or change, in ADM for the control group to the 
Delta in ADM for the experimental group. 
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Chapter IV 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
The sample included 30 flight students enrolled in a baccalaureate program at 
ERAU. The sample included 23 male students and 7 female students. The control group 
was composed of 12 male students and 3 female students; the experimental group was 
composed of 11 male students and 4 female students.  
All participants had relatively low total flight time. Total time was recorded from 
each participant’s logbook at the beginning of his or her first AATD session. The 
minimum total time was 55 hours and the maximum total time was 510 hours. Twenty-
three of the participants (out of 30 total) had fewer than 200 hours. Figure 2 shows the 
range of total time of all the participants, and Figure 3 shows the range of total time of 
the participants for the control and the experimental groups (grouped in 50-hour 
intervals).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Total time of all participants.  
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Figure 3. Total time of the participants, control and experimental groups. 
 
 
 
The participants held a varying range of pilot certificates and ratings. Figure 4 
shows a count of participants by the most advanced rating held. Figure 5 shows a count 
of participants by the most advanced rating held for the control and the experimental 
groups. The mode of the sample was the private pilot certificate. The population also 
included nine commercial pilots and four student pilots. Four of the commercial pilots 
were also CFIs. One participant who held a glider rating was categorized according to 
that participant’s highest airplane certificate, private pilot certificate with multi-engine 
rating.  
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Figure 4. Highest certification held by the participants. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Highest certification held by the participants, control and experimental groups. 
 
 
 
Dependent variables. Each of the participants was scored at multiple decisions 
points within each AATD session using seven variables. The data were either nominal or 
ordinal as follows:  
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 Nominal Variables 
o Problem Detected (Yes/No) 
o Problem Resolved (Yes/No) 
o Safe Outcome (Yes/No) 
 Ordinal Variables 
o Problem Comprehended (1, 2, or 3) 
o Problem Projected (1, 2, or 3) 
o Decision Process Used (1, 2, or 3) 
o Timely manner (1, 2, or 3) 
The researcher then averaged the session scores to generate an overall ADM score 
for that participant in that AATD session. Finally, the researcher calculated the Delta 
(change) in each participant’s ADM between Round One and Round Two. These 
calculations yielded the following ordinal variables: 
 Ordinal Variables, Calculated 
o Overall ADM (0 - 3) 
o Delta Problem Comprehended (0 - 3) 
o Delta Problem Projected (0 - 3) 
o Delta Decision Process Used (0 - 3) 
o Delta Timely manner (0 - 3) 
o Delta Overall ADM (0 - 3) 
The researcher counted the nominal data and aggregated them for the two groups, 
control or experimental. Figures 6 through 8 show the percentage of decisions for which 
the participants received a Yes score instead of a No. For Problem Detected (Figure 6), a 
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Yes means the participant detected the problem. For Problem Resolved (Figure 7), a Yes 
means the participant successfully resolved the problem. For Safe Outcome (Figure 8), a 
Yes means that the participant overcame the problem to reach a safe outcome.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Participants detected the problem, percentage of decisions.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Participants resolved the problem, percentage of decisions. 
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Figure 8. Participants reached a safe outcome.  
 
 
Table 1 shows the five ordinal variables (Problem Comprehended, Problem 
Projected, Decision Process Used, Timely Manner, and Overall ADM) for the control and 
experimental groups in the first AATD sessions. Very few participants received 3s. 
Slightly more received 1s, and the majority received 2s. 
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Table 1 
Ordinal Variables for the Control and Experimental Groups, First AATD Sessions 
  Comp Proj Proc Time Overall 
Control N 15 15 15 15 15 
Mean 1.78 1.76 1.64 1.60 1.69 
Range 1.33 1.67 1.33 1.50 1.33 
Minimum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Maximum 2.33 2.67 2.33 2.50 2.33 
Std. Deviation .32 .42 .44 .54 .40 
Experimental N 15 15 15 15 15 
Mean 1.88 1.82 1.74 1.82 1.82 
Range 1.67 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.92 
Minimum 1.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.08 
Maximum 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Std. Deviation .47 .65 .71 .74 .63 
Note. Comp = Problem Comprehended, Proj = Problem Projected, Proc = Decision 
Process Used, Time = Timely Manner, Overall = Overall ADM.  
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Table 2 shows the five ordinal variables for the control and experimental groups 
in the second AATD sessions.  
 
 
Table 2 
Ordinal Variables for the Control and Experimental Groups, Second AATD Sessions 
  Comp Proj Proc Time Overall 
Control N 15 15 15 15 15 
Mean 2.02 1.96 1.83 1.82 1.91 
Range 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Minimum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Maximum 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Std. Deviation .58 .68 .69 .74 .65 
Experimental N 15 15 15 15 15 
Mean 2.02 1.93 1.89 1.96 1.95 
Range .67 1.67 1.33 1.67 1.17 
Minimum 1.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.25 
Maximum 2.33 2.67 2.33 2.67 2.42 
Std. Deviation .20 .42 .37 .45 .33 
Note. Comp = Problem Comprehended, Proj = Problem Projected, Proc = Decision 
Process Used, Time = Timely Manner, Overall = Overall ADM.  
 
 
 
Table 3 shows the Delta, or change, in the five ordinal variables between the first 
and second AATD sessions for the control and experimental groups. The Delta was 
calculated by subtracting each participant’s Round One scores from their respective 
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Round Two scores. A positive Delta indicated an improvement in ADM; a negative Delta 
indicated a regression.  
 
 
Table 3 
Delta of Ordinal Variables for the Control and Experimental Groups  
  
Delta 
Comp 
Delta 
Proj 
Delta 
Proc 
Delta 
Time 
Delta 
Overall 
Control N 15 15 15 15 15 
Mean .24 .20 .19 .22 .21 
Range 1.33 1.33 1.50 2.00 1.21 
Minimum -.33 -.33 -.50 -.67 -.38 
Maximum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.33 .83 
Std. Deviation .42 .43 .50 .63 .44 
Experimental N 15 15 15 15 15 
Mean .14 .11 .14 .13 .13 
Range 1.67 2.00 2.33 2.67 2.00 
Minimum -1.00 -1.33 -1.33 -1.33 -1.25 
Maximum .67 .67 1.00 1.33 .75 
Std. Deviation .40 .56 .72 .69 .56 
Note. Comp = Problem Comprehended, Proj = Problem Projected, Proc = Decision 
Process Used, Time = Timely Manner, Overall = Overall ADM.  
 
 
 
Reliability Testing 
A series of Chronbach’s alpha analyses was conducted to measure the reliability 
of the data. The first analysis measured the consistency of the ordinal variable scores for 
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all participants in Round One, excluding their Overall ADM scores. The Chronbach’s 
alpha on standardized items for those four variables was 0.966. The second analysis 
measured the consistency of the ordinal variable scores for all participants in Round Two, 
excluding their Overall ADM scores. The Chronbach’s alpha on standardized items for 
those four variables was 0.963.  
 The next analyses included the scores for Overall ADM. The third analysis 
measured the consistency of all ordinal variable scores for all participants in Round One. 
The Chronbach’s alpha on standardized items for those five variables was 0.980. The 
fourth analysis measured the consistency of all ordinal variable scores for all participants 
in Round Two. The Chronbach’s alpha on standardized items for those five variables was 
0.978.   
Hypothesis Testing 
Several Mann-Whitney tests and Wilcoxon tests were calculated to test the null 
hypothesis - There was no difference in demonstrated ADM between pilots who received 
specialized ADM training and pilots who received no specialized training, for flight 
students enrolled in a baccalaureate program at ERAU. 
Baseline ADM performance. A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the 
null hypothesis - There was no difference in Round One Problem Comprehended 
between the control and experimental groups. Figure 9 shows the results. There was no 
difference in Round One Problem Comprehended between the control and experimental 
groups.  
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Figure 9. Round One Problem Comprehended scores, Control and Experimental groups. 
 
 
 
A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Round One Problem Projected between the control and experimental 
groups. Figure 10 shows the results. There was no difference in Round One Problem 
Projected between the control and experimental groups. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Round One Problem Projected scores, Control and Experimental groups. 
 
   
 
A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Round One Decision Process Used between the control and experimental 
groups. Figure 11 shows the results. There was no difference in Round One Decision 
Process Used between the control and experimental groups. 
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Figure 11. Round One Decision Process Used scores, Control and Experimental groups.  
 
 
 
A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Round One Timely Manner between the control and experimental groups. 
Figure 12 shows the results. There was no difference in Round One Timely Manner 
between the control and experimental groups. 
 
   
 
Figure 12. Round One Timely Manner scores, Control and Experimental groups.  
 
 
   
A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Round One Overall ADM between the control and experimental groups. 
Figure 13 shows the results. There was no difference in Round One Overall ADM 
between the control and experimental groups. 
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Figure 13. Round One Overall ADM scores, Control and Experimental groups. 
 
 
   
Ending ADM performance. A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null 
hypothesis - There was no difference in Round Two Problem Comprehended between the 
control and experimental groups. Figure 14 shows the results. There was no difference in 
Round Two Problem Comprehended between the control and experimental groups. 
 
   
 
Figure 14. Round Two Problem Comprehended scores, Control and Experimental 
groups.  
 
   
 
A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Round Two Problem Projected between the control and experimental 
groups. Figure 15 shows the results. There was no difference in Round Two Problem 
Projected between the control and experimental groups. 
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Figure 15. Round Two Problem Projected scores, Control and Experimental groups.  
 
 
   
A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Round Two Decision Process Used between the control and experimental 
groups. Figure 16 shows the results. There was no difference in Round Two Decision 
Process Used between the control and experimental groups. 
 
   
 
Figure 16. Round Two Decision Process Used scores, Control and Experimental groups.  
 
   
 
A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Round Two Timely Manner between the control and experimental groups. 
Figure 17 shows the results. There was no difference in Round Two Timely Manner 
between the control and experimental groups. 
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Figure 17.  Round Two Timely Manner scores, Control and Experimental groups.  
   
 
 
A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Round Two Overall ADM between the control and experimental groups. 
Figure 18 shows the results. There was no difference in Round Two Overall ADM 
between the control and experimental groups. 
 
   
 
Figure 18. Round Two Overall ADM scores, Control and Experimental groups.  
 
 
   
Change in ADM for the control group. A Wilcoxon test was calculated to test 
the null hypothesis - There was no difference in Problem Comprehended between Round 
One and Round Two for the control group. Figure 19 shows the results. There was a 
difference in Problem Comprehended between Round One and Round Two for the 
control group. 
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Figure 19. Problem Comprehended scores in Round One and Round Two for the Control 
group.  
   
 
 
A Wilcoxon test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Problem Projected between Round One and Round Two for the control 
group. Figure 20 shows the results. There was no difference in Problem Projection 
between Round One and Round Two for the control group. 
 
   
 
Figure 20. Problem Projected scores in Round One and Round Two for the Control 
group.  
     
 
 
A Wilcoxon test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Decision Process Used between Round One and Round Two for the control 
group. Figure 21 shows the results. There was no difference in Decision Process Used 
between Round One and Round Two for the control group. 
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Figure 21.  Decision Process Used scores in Round One and Round Two for the Control 
group.  
   
 
 
A Wilcoxon test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Timely Manner between Round One and Round Two for the control group. 
Figure 22 shows the results. There was no difference in Timely Manner between Round 
One and Round Two for the control group. 
 
   
 
Figure 22. Timely Manner scores in Round One and Round Two for the Control group.  
   
 
 
A Wilcoxon test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Overall ADM between Round One and Round Two for the control group. 
Figure 23 shows the results. There was no difference in Overall ADM between Round 
One and Round Two for the control group. 
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Figure 23. Overall ADM scores in Round One and Round Two for the Control group. 
   
 
 
Change in ADM for the experimental group. A Wilcoxon test was calculated to 
test the null hypothesis - There was no difference in in Problem Comprehended between 
Round One and Round Two for the experimental group. Figure 24 shows the results. 
There was no difference in Problem Comprehended between Round One and Round Two 
for the experimental group. 
 
   
 
Figure 24. Problem Comprehended scores in Round One and Round Two for the 
Experimental group. 
   
 
 
A Wilcoxon test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Problem Projected between Round One and Round Two for the 
experimental group. Figure 25 shows the results. There was no difference in Problem 
Projected between Round One and Round Two for the experimental group. 
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Figure 25. Problem Projected scores in Round One and Round Two for the Experimental 
group.  
   
 
 
A Wilcoxon test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Decision Process Used between Round One and Round Two for the 
experimental group. Figure 26 shows the results. There was no difference in Decision 
Process Used between Round One and Round Two for the experimental group. 
 
   
 
Figure 26. Decision Process Used scores in Round One and Round Two for the 
Experimental group.  
   
 
 
A Wilcoxon test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Timely Manner between Round One and Round Two for the experimental 
group. Figure 27 shows the results. There was no difference in Timely Manner between 
Round One and Round Two for the experimental group. 
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Figure 27. Timely Manner scores in Round One and Round Two for the Experimental 
group. 
   
 
 
A Wilcoxon test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Overall ADM between Round One and Round Two for the experimental 
group. Figure 28 shows the results. There was no difference in Overall ADM between 
Round One and Round Two for the experimental group. 
 
   
 
Figure 28. Overall ADM scores in Round One and Round Two for the Experimental 
group.  
   
 
 
Comparing delta between control and experimental groups. A Mann-Whitney 
test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no difference in Delta Problem 
Comprehended (the change between Round One and Round Two) between the control 
and experimental groups. Figure 29 shows the results. There was no difference in Delta 
Problem Comprehended between the control and the experimental groups. 
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Figure 29. Delta Problem Comprehended for the Control and Experimental groups.  
   
 
 
A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Delta Problem Projected between the control and experimental groups. 
Figure 30 shows the results. There was no difference in Delta Problem Projected between 
the control and the experimental groups. 
 
   
 
Figure 30. Delta Problem Projected for the Control and Experimental groups.  
   
 
 
A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Delta Decision Process Used between the control and experimental groups. 
Figure 31 shows the results. There was no difference in Delta Decision Process Used 
between the control and the experimental groups. 
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Figure 31. Delta Decision Process Used for the Control and Experimental groups.  
   
 
 
A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Delta Timely Manner between the control and experimental groups. Figure 
32 shows the results. There was no difference in Delta Timely Manner between the 
control and the experimental groups. 
 
 
 
Figure 32. Delta Timely Manner for the Control and Experimental groups.  
   
   
 
A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no 
difference in Delta Overall ADM between the control and experimental groups. Figure 33 
shows the results. There was no difference in Delta Overall ADM between the control 
and the experimental groups.  
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Figure 33. Delta Overall ADM for the Control and Experimental groups.  
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Chapter V 
Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Discussions 
Significance of results. The data from this study did not produce many 
statistically significant results or provide overwhelming support for the research 
hypothesis. Several factors could have contributed to these results.  
Experiment design factors. 
Impact of variations in the sample. The population for the experiment was more 
varied than originally intended by the researcher; thus, subsets of the population were 
small. The variation in ratings and certificates yielded interesting results, both expected 
and unexpected. Too few participants fell into the separate categories to make any 
generalizations, but the variation between how participants with different certificates 
fared suggest further research is required. More research questions include: (a) when is 
the best time to introduce ADM training? and (b) how effective are the current MBT 
curricula, compared to SBT curricula for teaching ADM?  
Several comparisons can be made based on the researcher’s observations. Table 4 
compares the Overall ADM scores and Deltas for the participants. Participants are 
organized by whether they were part of the control or the experimental group and by 
highest certification (CFIs were also commercial pilots but were separated into their own 
category). Table 5 compares the same data for the participants but organizes them into 
CFI and non-CFI participants.  
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Table 4 
 
Overall ADM and Delta Overall ADM for Participants Grouped By Highest 
Certification: Control, Experimental, and All 
 
 Count Round I           Round II Delta  
Student      
     Control  3 1.21 1.39 0.18 
     Experimental 1 1.13 1.25 0.13 
     All Student 4 1.19 1.35 0.17 
     
Private      
     Control  8 1.80 2.03 0.22 
     Experimental 9 1.64 1.97 0.33 
     All Private 17 1.72 2.00 0.28 
     
Commercial      
     Control  3 1.75 2.17 0.42 
     Experimental 2 2.29 2.17 -0.13 
     All Commercial 5 1.97 2.17 0.20 
     
CFI     
     Control  1 2.13 1.75 -0.38 
     Experimental 3 2.25 1.97 -0.28 
     All CFI 4 2.22 1.92 -0.30 
 
 
Regardless of whether they were given the experimental SBT ADM training, the 
student pilots generally scored lower than the higher-certificated participants. 
Anecdotally (the number of student pilots is small), the three control student pilot 
participants averaged higher ADM scores in both rounds and a higher Delta than the lone 
experimental student pilot participant. This suggests that the training provided could be 
modified to better address student pilots’ level of experience.  
The control private pilot participants averaged a high Delta of 0.22, suggesting 
that private pilots benefit from ADM training whether it is MBT or SBT. The 
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experimental private pilots averaged the highest Delta Overall ADM of the experimental 
participants (0.33). The private pilots’ improvement supports other research speculating 
that newly certificated private pilots would benefit greatly from ADM training (Adams, 
Hamilton, Koonce, & Hwoschinsky, 2002). That the experimental private pilot 
participants showed such great improvement suggests the experimental treatment was 
particularly effective for these participants. The experimental private pilots’ higher Delta 
suggests that SBT ADM training was more effective than the MBT received by the 
control private pilot participants.  
The three control commercial pilot participants averaged the highest Delta Overall 
ADM score of the control group (0.42). The two experimental commercial pilot 
participants averaged the highest Overall ADM score in Round One and tied with the 
three Round Two control commercial pilot participants for the highest Round Two 
Overall ADM scores. The experimental commercial pilot participants’ Round Two scores 
were slightly lower than their Round One scores, though, resulting in a negative Delta 
Overall ADM. These results are inconclusive on whether SBT ADM training benefits 
commercial pilots more than MBT.  
All of the CFI participants outperformed the other participants in the first AATD 
sessions. However, the CFI participants regressed in the second AATD sessions leading 
to negative Deltas (-0.38 and -0.28 for the control and experimental groups respectively).  
Working as a CFI adds the task of providing instruction to the mental workload that a GA 
pilot would otherwise be responsible for. The researcher therefore expected the CFIs to 
exhibit more complete SA and more efficient ADM, as they did in the first AATD 
sessions. Although the researcher expected that there would be less room for 
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improvement for CFIs than for non-CFIs, the researcher still expected a positive change 
in ADM. There was no clear reason why the CFIs regressed as a group in the second 
AATD sessions, other than the small number of CFIs (N=4).  
 
 
Table 5 
 
Overall ADM and Delta Overall ADM for CFI and Non-CFI Participants: Control, 
Experimental, and All 
 
 Count Round I  Round II  Delta          
CFI     
     Control  1 2.13 1.75 -0.38 
     Experimental 3 2.25 1.97 -0.28 
     All CFI 4 2.22 1.92 -0.30 
     
Non-CFI      
     Control  14 1.66 1.92 0.26 
     Experimental 12 1.71 1.94 0.24 
     All Non-CFI 26 1.68 1.93 0.25 
 
 
Figures 34, 35, and 36 show the distribution of participants’ Overall ADM scores 
in a linear regression for the first and second AATD sessions, respectively, compared to 
their total time. ADM literature led the researcher to expect that a participant’s 
experience would increase with total time, leading to a correlation between a participant’s 
ADM scores and his or her total time. The researcher also expected the SBT ADM 
training to improve the participants’ ADM above what they would have demonstrated 
without the training.  
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Figure 34. Total time and Overall ADM for all participants in Round One 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35. Total time and Overall ADM for the control participants in Round Two 
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Figure 36. Total time and Overall ADM for the experimental participants in Round Two 
 
 
 
An examination of Figure 34 shows an expected positive correlation between total 
time and overall ADM scores in the first AATD sessions. The positive correlation 
between total time and overall ADM scores is also present in the second AATD sessions 
as seen in Figures 35 and 36. However, a comparison of the two linear regressions in 
Figures 35 and 36 with the regression in Figure 34 shows that the positive correlation 
between total time and overall ADM is weaker for the control participants in the second 
AATD session and almost non-existent for the experimental participants in the second 
AATD session. The weakened correlation between increasing total time and improved 
ADM for the experimental participants in Round Two suggests that the experimental 
SBT ADM training was effective at developing lower time pilots’ ADM. 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
O
v
er
a
ll
 A
D
M
, 
R
o
u
n
d
 T
w
o
, 
E
x
p
er
im
en
ta
l 
Total Time (hours) 
87 
 
Comparisons here are anecdotal since the sample for each experience level was 
not sufficient to allow meaningful statistical analysis. Further research is needed to 
determine whether these conclusions can be generalized.  
G1000 proficiency. Participants’ success could have been influenced by their 
proficiency with the G1000. All students had some experience with it, but the skill level 
ranged from completely ignoring the system, through trying to use the very high 
frequency (VHF) omnidirectional radio ranges (VORs) but not the GPS moving map, 
through programming the entire flight plan into the MFD. Those who did not use the 
moving map generally had a difficult time locating themselves at the beginning of the 
scenario and did poorly when confronted with a significant decision later in the scenario. 
Others persisted in inept attempts to use a particular feature of the G1000, resulting in a 
higher workload and poorer ADM. Both IFR and VFR sectional charts were available to 
the participants, and the AATD was limited to a single visual display. Participants could 
choose whether to primarily use VFR or IFR charts or the G1000 or a combination of the 
three to locate themselves. Some chose more effectively than others. 
Types of ADM tested.  
In-flight ADM. The scenarios used to test the participants’ ADM focused on in-
flight ADM. Some pre-flight ADM was required, in that participants had to decide how 
thoroughly to review the planning information given to them, and how to manage their 
materials effectively in the AATD’s pilot station. The extent to which the participants 
chose to review and manage the preflight planning information did impact the 
participants’ performance, particularly when it came to locating his or her initial position 
and locating a diversion destination (if the scenario required it). However, the researcher 
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eliminated most of the pre-flight ADM by giving the participant the completed pre-flight 
planning documents. Therefore, weather information was given but the participant was 
not invited to verbalize a go or no-go decision. Likewise, weight and balance, 
performance calculations, and route and altitude choices were pre-determined for the 
participants.  
Quick decisions. Several participants remarked that their particular actions were 
not “decisions.” When questioned further, some explained that they thought the action 
was too immediate or too simple to be called a decision. This suggested that many 
participants thought a decision must take a long time; another possible explanation is that 
the participants simply did not know how to explain their thought processes. 
Decision points in each scenario. Table 6 shows the Overall ADM scores grouped 
by the scenario the participants flew in their first and second AATD sessions. 
 
 
Table 6 
 
Overall ADM Scores and Delta Overall ADM, by Scenario Flown in Rounds One and 
Two  
 
Scenario Number Round I  Round II Delta  
1  1.43 2.06  0.636 
2  1.92 1.83 -0.083 
3  1.84 1.83 -0.004 
4 1.81 1.97  0.153 
 
 
The four scenarios used to test the participants’ ADM included a variety of 
decisions. This variety meant that no one ADM process was the most appropriate to all of 
the scenarios. Generalizing the required ADM allowed the researchers to test for 
improvements in ADM without contamination from rehearsal effect.  Further research 
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would be required to analyze the effectiveness of the SBT ADM training provided in this 
experiment for improving different types of decision-making.  
The first decision that had to be made for each scenario was to determine how to 
fly the aircraft – what heading, altitude, and airspeed – and depended on the participants’ 
ability to determine their location. In Scenario 1, this decision is the focus of the scenario. 
The participants were placed nearly 12 miles off shore over the Gulf of Mexico (due 
West of the Cross City VOR) at an altitude of 4,500 feet. This location was several miles 
off course, and put the participants beyond gliding distance of the shoreline in a single-
engine aircraft. Had an engine failure occurred there, the participants would have had to 
ditch in open water.  
The expected outcome was that the participants would see that they were over 
water, locate the nearest land, and turn immediately towards the nearest shoreline 
regardless of whether that course gave them a short intercept to the planned route of 
flight or necessitated back-tracking. The participants had the most difficulty with this 
scenario in the first AATD sessions, perhaps because they did not expect the problem to 
occur so soon in the scenario. ADM performance improved dramatically in the second 
AATD sessions, though, with participants scoring higher in Scenario 1 than any of the 
other scenarios (see Table 6).  
Scenario 2 placed the participants on the planned route, 10 miles south of the 
Cross City VOR, on the planned heading of 352 degrees at 4,500 feet. This location was 
roughly mid-way between the departure airport and the destination. After reaching Cross 
City, the planned route turned to the northwest then due west. However, stronger than 
forecast winds (from the West at 60 knots) had been causing fuel to burn faster than 
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planned so that the participants started the scenario with only 17 gallons of fuel (the flight 
plan anticipated having 35 gallons remaining at that location). The fuel remaining would 
not have been enough to get them to the next planned waypoint after Cross City Airport 
given the winds and the minimum required fuel reserves.  
The expected outcome was that the participants would decide to divert to a nearby 
airport such as Cross City Airport to refuel. In Scenario 2, the participants had more time 
to make a decision than they did in Scenario 1, depending on how quickly they noticed 
the fuel and the winds. Participants performed the best in this scenario in the first AATD 
sessions, but showed a slight regression in the second AATD sessions (see Table 6). This 
type of decision-making may have been more familiar to the participants before the 
experiment as current ERAU flight training emphasizes fuel management as part of 
cross-country flight planning. 
A mechanical malfunction and light rain provided the main decision points in 
Scenario 3. Light rain began two minutes after the scenario started, although conditions 
remained VFR. Four minutes after the scenario started, the engine started running 
roughly. Engine roughness was indicated by variations in engine noise and RPMs 
indicated on the tachometer. The fluctuations in engine power worsened if the participant 
did not appear to notice them, and it persisted regardless of what the participants did to 
troubleshoot in the air. The expected outcome was that the participants would divert into 
a nearby airport before the engine failed or before encountering IFR conditions.  
In Scenario 4, the participants had to decide what to do after their passenger 
started to get nauseous. The researchers simulated turbulent conditions starting two 
minutes into the scenario using the weather settings on the AATD. Then the researchers 
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role-played as the participant’s “Auntie,” getting progressively sicker and eventually 
vomiting. The participants were expected to divert to a nearby airport with the 
appropriate facilities to help the passenger recover. 
Unintended decisions. The researcher assumed that the participants would be able 
to readily locate themselves with the resources available. This was not always the case, 
and difficulties locating themselves had a consequently negative impact on some 
participants’ ADM with respect to the intended decision points. Other participants 
commented that they did not like being “dropped into the scenario in mid-air,” because 
they felt it did not give them the time to prepare themselves or to set up the avionics the 
way they usually do. Others simply adapted to the lack of preparatory time, commenting 
that they used the bare minimum avionics to locate themselves and get on course before 
they took the time to set up the avionics the way they usually would. 
Maintaining realism of the scenario. Conducting the scenarios in an AATD had 
many advantages. The AATD allowed the researcher to put the participant in scenarios 
that would be potentially life threatening in an aircraft without actually impacting the 
participants’ safety. The AATD was also a more practical platform for training ADM 
since it was much more cost-effective to operate than a flight training device (FTD) or an 
aircraft, and it was already set up in a lab with video and audio recording equipment. 
Flying the AATD instead of an aircraft also allowed the researcher to control the 
variables of weather and maintenance.  
However, using the AATD instead of an FTD or an aircraft introduced a 
challenge that is inherent in any simulation - maintaining the realism of the scenario. The 
researchers took many precautions to make the AATD sessions as life-like as possible – 
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to make the participants feel that they were in a real airplane dealing with that actual 
scenario. It was hoped that the participants would become involved enough that they 
would react as they would in a real airplane and gain equivalent experience. Several 
factors interfered with the desired realism and possibly reduced the effectiveness of the 
AATD sessions. 
Several participants asked the researchers a question mid- scenario despite being 
briefed that the researchers would merely be observing once the scenario started. “Where 
am I?” was the most common question asked. Several participants also exhibited 
behaviors such as laughing when it was inappropriate to the scenario, indicating that they 
did not mentally accept the scenario as “real.” Other participants, confronted with 
simulated engine roughness, noted the fluctuations in RPM and engine noise but told the 
researcher during debrief that they thought it was “just the sim” and did nothing to 
address the engine roughness. 
Deviations from the scenario procedure. 
AATD-induced deviations from the scenario procedure.  
Un-programmed engine failure. The AATD induced unintended variations to 
several participants’ scenarios. On one occasion when the researcher programmed engine 
roughness, the AATD failed the engine instead. The researchers were unable to determine 
why the AATD failed the engine and allowed the simulation to continue, scoring that 
participant’s ADM based on the engine failure instead of the intended scenario. On 
multiple occasions, the AATD displayed cloud cover that was thicker than programmed 
by the researcher. The planned flight was to be conducted VFR and the researcher 
therefore programmed a low scattered layer that should not have been an obstacle to 
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descending VFR into an airport. However, several participants found themselves 
apparently in a solid cloud layer when they descended into what looked like a clear space 
between the scattered clouds on the visual display. This understandably changed those 
participants’ ADM by introducing a VFR-into-IFR aspect to the scenario.  
Clouds and Visibility. The researchers followed standardized procedures to set up 
the visual environment for each AATD session. The procedures specified VFR clouds 
and visibility for all four scenarios. One scenario called for rain, but the rain was not 
associated with lower visibility or cloud bases. In a few scenarios, the AATD displayed 
much thicker clouds than the researchers had programmed. The visibility also appeared 
significantly lower than programmed during one session. These aberrations caused 
several participants to request IFR clearance or to divert to an airport behind them. 
Auto-zoom. Auto-zoom is a function of the G1000 that adjusts the zoom on the 
moving map display by referencing ground speed. The faster the ground speed, the 
farther out it zooms. An auto-zooming map can aid a pilot’s SA by zooming out to show 
nearby airports and navigation aids. However, the researchers wanted to observe whether 
the participants would effectively use the moving map as a source of information. The 
researchers therefore intended to start everyone with the moving map zoomed in as 
tightly as possible and auto-zoom turned off. Auto-zoom activated and zoomed the range 
out on the moving map for some participants though, making it impossible to determine 
whether those participants would have zoomed the display out on their own or whether 
they would have tried to navigate without the moving map. 
Operator-induced deviations from the scenario procedure. At two other times, 
the researchers inadvertently changed the scenario. In one instance, the researcher briefed 
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the participant enroute that the weather included a ceiling at 800 feet when the planned 
briefing called for a scattered cloud layer at 800 feet. That participant then requested an 
IFR clearance. A different participant started his scenario before the researchers realized 
that the fuel had been inadvertently left at the levels for the scenario given to the previous 
participant (which was low enough to require a fuel stop).  
One participant’s behavior during the second AATD session suggested that the 
participant probably talked with other study participants about the scenarios in their first 
AATD sessions. The scenario for that participant’s second AATD session involved a sick 
passenger. The participant seemed to anticipate that the passenger would be sick, asking 
if she felt sick before the passenger had remarked on anything except the view. On one 
occasion, the researchers decided not to present a participant with all of the decisions 
called for by the scenario. The participant seemed to be overloaded already, and further 
challenges seemed unproductive. 
Treatment design factors. Limitations of the study strongly influenced the 
design of the experimental treatment. Constraints included the participants’ schedules, the 
study’s condensed timeline, and budget. By necessity, the experimental treatment was 
very condensed, compared to other SBT ADM training efforts. The treatment consisted 
of one session lasting one and one-half hours. It was conducted in a classroom using a 
PowerPoint presentation as a visual aid, and some time elapsed before the participants 
completed their second AATD sessions.  
Treatment would likely have been more effective if the resources had been 
available to conduct more than one session of ADM training. Harnessing participants’ 
involvement in the material was limited to measures the researcher could take in the 
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treatment session. Increasing the participants’ involvement by assigning homework or 
reading (for example, reading about ADM models or ADM-related accidents) beforehand 
could have helped them absorb the information. Also, the treatment would likely have 
been more effective if the guided discussion had been followed immediately by a hands-
on application in a scenario in an AATD. Some participants waited several days after 
completing the treatment before schedules allowed them to complete the second AATD 
session.  
Researcher and instrument factors. 
Bias. The author conducted all of the AATD scenarios (with the help of another 
researcher), conducted the ADM training for the experimental group, and was the sole 
scorer for all of the participants. The fact that the same person conducted all aspects of 
the experiment reduced the researcher’s impartiality. Knowing whether each participant 
was in the control or experimental group could have biased the researcher’s scoring. The 
researcher also knew some of the participants through work as a flight instructor, others 
through student groups; this familiarity created another opportunity for bias to affect the 
results. Using multiple graders, who did not conduct any of the experimental training, to 
score the participants would have allowed inter-rater reliability to remove this bias.  
Scoring. Quantifying a person’s ADM is difficult by nature. The scoring method 
used in this experiment to quantify each participant’s ADM was purposefully vague in 
order to lessen the impact of a single scorer’s mistakes. The options of 1, 2, or 3 did not 
discriminate the participants’ ADM as much as a 5-point or 7-point scale would have, but 
it allowed the scorer to reliably assess a participant’s ADM. A 5-point or 7-point scale 
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would require very definitive criteria and several independent scorers to increase the 
validity and reliability of the assessments.  
Each participant received several scores per AATD session. The researcher then 
averaged the scores for each participant to calculate an Overall ADM score for that 
participant in that session. This averaging process further smoothed out any scoring 
errors the researcher may have made.  
Instrument reliability. The researcher conducted four Chronbach’s alpha analyses 
to measure the research instrument’s reliability.  These analyses were especially 
important given some of the researcher’s choices in designing the study. The study’s use 
of a single person to train and score the participants created the possibility of bias and 
negated inter-rater reliability. The researcher also chose to use a relatively vague 3-point 
scale to score ADM. Furthermore, the literature review did not reveal a precedent for 
averaging scores for different aspects of ADM into an Overall ADM score. 
The Chronbach’s alpha analyses revealed that the instrument was extremely 
reliable despite the single scorer, vague scoring method, and unprecedented Overall 
ADM scores. Chronbach’s alpha is measured on a scale of 0 to 1.0. An accepted “rule of 
thumb” for determining what is an acceptable alpha is: α > 0.7 acceptable, α > 0.8 good, 
and α > 0.9 excellent (George & Mallery, 2011, p. 231).  
The Chronbach’s alpha for the ordinal scores excluding Overall ADM in Round 
One and Round Two were excellent – 0.966 and 0.963 respectively. The Chronbach’s 
alpha for the ordinal scores including Overall ADM in Round One and Round Two of 
0.980 and 0.978 respectively were even higher. The researcher had expected the 
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Chronbach’s alpha to be higher when the Overall ADM scores were included because the 
Overall ADM scores averaged scores that had already been shown to be highly reliable. 
Impact of video quality on data collection. All AATD sessions were recorded 
using two cameras installed in the High Altitude Lab (HAL), headset microphones, and a 
portable audio recorder. The video recorded by the two cameras in the HAL was good 
enough to see what the participant was doing, but the poor lighting and resolution made it 
difficult or impossible to tell what kind of chart they were using or what any of the 
displays were showing. The cameras also did not record sounds that were not on the 
microphones. This means that audio cues like rain or changes in engine RPM were lost in 
the video recording. This made reviewing the footage more difficult. Some details that 
could have enabled the researcher to determine what the participant was thinking were 
lost in the video and could not be accurately recalled from the researcher’s personal 
memories. 
Reviewing the video and audio recordings after the participants completed the 
scenarios would have been easier, had the researcher modified the data collection device. 
The inclusion of a time log on the data collection device to record start and stop times 
and times of significant events would have facilitated observations both during the 
session and during later review. Recording the ground tracks would have facilitated 
evaluation particularly for the participants whose scenario started over water. 
Conclusions 
The research hypothesis of this study was: there was a difference in demonstrated 
ADM ability between pilots who received scenario-based ADM training and pilots who 
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did not receive scenario-based ADM training, for flight students enrolled in a 
baccalaureate program at ERAU.  
Statistical tests showed no significant difference between the control and 
experimental groups’ ADM ability for any of the variables in the first AATD sessions. 
Although the experimental group exhibited higher mean scores than the control group for 
all variables in the first AATD sessions, the two groups exhibited statistically equivalent 
ADM ability. This meant that statistical differences in the two groups’ ADM ability in 
the second AATD sessions did not result from an a priori difference.  
The expected outcome of the treatment was that the experimental group would 
exhibit statistically better ADM ability than the control group in the second AATD 
sessions. Statistical tests showed no significant difference between the control and 
experimental groups’ ADM ability in the second AATD sessions. Despite the 
experimental treatment, the ADM ability of the control and the experimental groups 
remained statistically equivalent.  
The researcher expected both the control and the experimental groups to improve 
on their ADM scores from their first AATD sessions to their second AATD sessions. As 
expected, both the control and experimental groups showed higher mean scores for all 
variables in the second AATD session. Although both groups showed higher mean scores 
in the second AATD sessions, most of the differences were statistically insignificant.  
The only statistically significant difference was in Problem Comprehended for the 
control group. Had alpha been set to 0.1 instead of 0.05, the differences in Projection (p = 
0.085) and Overall ADM (p = 0.089) for the control group would have been significant. 
The difference in Problem Comprehended (p = 0.104) for the experimental group would 
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have been close to significance. The general absence of statistically significant 
differences indicated that the experimental treatment had no significant impact on the 
participants’ demonstrated ADM ability. 
However, the treatment appeared to have a practically significant impact on the 
experimental groups’ ADM. The experimental group’s average Overall ADM improved 
from 1.82 in the first AATD session to 1.95 in the second AATD session (see Table 7). 
Although the experimental group’s Delta (0.13) was smaller than the control group’s 
Delta, the experimental group’s Overall ADM scores were higher than the control 
group’s Overall ADM scores in both the first and second AATD sessions (see Table 7).   
 
Table 7 
 
Practical Comparison of the Control and Experimental Groups, Overall ADM 
 
 First AATD Session Second AATD Session Delta Overall ADM 
Control 1.69 1.91 .21 
Experimental 1.82 1.95 .13 
 
 
 
The experimental group also scored higher than the control group in the second AATD 
session in Decision Process Used, Timely Manner, and Overall ADM. 
It is possible that the size and the diversity of the population sample resulted in a 
Type II error. The population sample was small for an experiment of this nature (N = 30). 
Although 30 subjects is a generally accepted minimum for statistical significance, using 
only the minimum number of participants and including participants with such a range of 
certifications and hours logged could have prevented a statistical difference in Overall 
ADM between the control and experimental groups.  
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Recommendations 
The data from this study did not statistically support incorporating SBT ADM 
training into GA flight training. However, previous research supports the hypotheses that 
ADM can be taught and that SBT is more effective than MBT for teaching ADM. The 
practical results of this study indicate that further research is warranted. 
Recommendations from this study thus include recommendations for further research and 
suggested improvements to the experiment design.  
Further research and analysis. Variations in the study’s sample raised many 
questions about ADM training with respect to differences in total time and certifications 
held. However, subsets of the sample for different certifications and total times were too 
small to allow statistical analysis of those factors’ impact on demonstrated ADM ability. 
Repeating this experiment with larger samples would allow meaningful analysis of the 
treatment’s impact on ADM for GA pilots with different certifications and total times. 
Researchers could derive significant implications for effective ADM training for pilots at 
different experience levels and aid in development of graduated ADM training, which 
could then be integrated into GA flight training. 
Further analysis of the participants’ ADM scores by scenarios would enable 
researchers to derive implications on the effectiveness of ADM training for different 
types of decisions. This would require a sample of at least 30 participants for each 
scenario.  
Suggested improvements for this study. This study had several limitations that 
significantly impacted the design of the experiment, the treatment design, the data 
analysis, and the results. Improvements for this study would address these limitations. 
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Experiment design factors.  Time and budget prevented the researcher from using 
a larger sample for the experiment. The researcher also used ERAU students exclusively 
because they were the most convenient. This study would benefit from using a larger 
sample from a more diverse GA pilot population. The experiment would also provide 
better results if the AATD sessions were recorded using cameras with higher quality 
video and audio. Poor lighting, resolution, and sound quality hindered the review of the 
AATD sessions and made scoring more difficult.  
Treatment design factors. Time and budget constrained the scope of the treatment 
the researcher could provide. The study would likely produce more conclusive results if 
the treatment were expanded beyond a single training session. The treatment would also 
be more effective if the researcher could integrate an AATD session into the end of 
treatment, as this would allow the participants to immediately practice the ADM 
processes they discussed in the treatment.  
Bias. The researcher conducted all of the AATD scenarios, conducted the training 
for the experimental group, and scored all of the participants. The researcher also knew 
some of the participants through work as a flight instructor and through student groups. 
Chronbach’s alpha analyses indicated that bias did not impact the reliability of the data in 
this study. Using multiple raters (whose knowledge of the participants was limited to 
what they observed in the AATD sessions) to blindly score the participants would have 
allowed the use of inter-rater reliability to make the results even more reliable.   
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Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
 
Application for IRB Approval 
 
Determination Form 
 
11-167 
 
 
Principle Investigator: Dr. Guy Smith 
 Other Investigators: Mariko Doskow, Michele Halleran, Michael Wiggins 
 
 
Project Title: Classroom and lab-based experiment to support a thesis 
 
 
 
Submission Date: October 2, 2011 
 
 
Determination Date: October 28, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
Review Board Use Only 
 
Initial Reviewer:  Teri Vigneau/Bert Boquet 
 
Exempt:  X Yes    ___ No 
 
Approved:  X Yes    ___ No 
 
Comments:  The purpose of this project is to measure the effectiveness of scenario-based 
training for accelerating improvement of judgment.  There will be one control group with 
no ADM (Aeronautical Decision Making) training and an experimental group with ADM 
training.  
 
Part of the study will be conducted in a classroom and part will take place in an AATD 
(Mentor Advanced) fixed (non-moving) flight simulator. There should be no risk to 
participants other than routine training so it may be considered exempt. [Teri Vigneau 
10-24-11] 
 
This falls under the university’s scope of operations and can be considered exempt. [Bert 
Boquet 10-24-11] 
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CONSENT FORM  
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
 
I consent to participating in the research project entitled: 
Improving Aeronautical Decision Making Ability through Specialized Training 
The principle investigator of the study is: 
Dr. Guy Smith 
Mariko Doskow, First student investigator 
Prof. Michele Halleran, Advisor 
Dr. Michael Wiggins, Advisor 
 
The purpose of this study is to measure pilot judgment.  The participants will complete 
two separate scenarios in a Mentor AATD, a fixed-based (non-moving) flight simulator. 
Some participants will participate in an additional classroom session.  Participants must 
have at least a student pilot certificate.  Risks associated with participation are 
comparable to ERAU training in a fixed base simulator or classroom. Potential benefits 
include a valuable learning experience and an input for a student’s resume. 
 
Total time commitment for participants will total between 3 and 4.5 hours.  Participants 
will be paid at a rate of $7.50 per hour. Participants have the right to refuse participation 
at any time with no penalty or prejudice against them; however, participants who do not 
complete all portions of the study (regardless of whether they are asked to participate in 
two or all three sessions) will not be compensated.  All personal information and 
experimental data collected for this study will be kept confidential. 
 
The individual above, or their research assistants, have explained the purpose of the 
study, the procedures to be followed, and the expected duration of my participation. 
Possible benefits of the study have been described, as have alternative procedures, if such 
procedures are applicable and available. 
 
I acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to obtain additional information regarding 
the study and that any questions I have raised have been answered to my full satisfaction. 
Furthermore, I understand that I am free to withdraw consent at any time and to 
discontinue participation in the study without prejudice to me. 
 
Finally, I acknowledge that I have read and fully understand the consent form. I sign it 
freely and voluntarily. A copy has been given to me. 
 
Date:  _____________ 
Name (please print):   ______________________________________ 
                           (Participant) 
Signed:  __________________________________________ 
                           (Participant) 
Signed:  __________________________________________            
(Researcher/Assistant) 
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PILOT BRIEFING 
 
 
Thank you for volunteering to be a test pilot for this research project! The purpose of this 
study is to measure pilot judgment.  The participants will complete two separate scenarios 
in a Mentor AATD, a fixed-based (non-moving) flight simulator. This Mentor is similar 
to the ones used for ADF training during ERAU’s instrument training course. Please keep 
in mind that we are not grading you – we are collecting data that will be de-identified and 
used to make future training improvements.  
 
We know that you will be tempted to tell your friends and colleagues about your 
experience. We ask that you refrain from discussing what you do, though. It is critical 
that all participants begin each scenario without any extra information in order to draw 
valid conclusions from this research.  
 
Each scenario begins in level cruise enroute on the VFR cross country flight detailed in 
the flight plan and documents provided (KRSW to KHRT, departing Mon Oct 31, 2011). 
We hope that you have fun during this session. Fly safe and enjoy the challenge! 
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Guided Discussion/Debrief 
Date: 
Scenario: 
Total time:  
 
1. What was your first concern? Next concern? 
 
 
2. What was your first action? 
 
 
3. Did you feel that you had any decisions to make? 
 
 
4. What choices were you considering? 
 
 
5. What resources did you use to help decision making? 
 
 
6. What were your choices in the end? 
 
 
7. What was your final decision? Why? 
 
 
8. What concerns did you have after you chose to …?
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Scenario 2 – Strong Westerly Headwinds Late in a Cross Country 
AATD Setup Procedure 
 
1. Complete AATD Startup Checklist. 
2. Wait for the communication channel to be reached, the screen will change colors 
until arriving at the default runway 7L DAB 
3. Follow 172 setup checklists to initiate glass cockpit, ensure cockpit controls are 
set up for flight and ready for the scenario to begin. 
Flaps – Up Standby Battery – On 
Mixture – Rich Ignition – Both 
Throttle – 2400 RPM Parking Brake – In 
Trim – Neutral Standby Static Source – In 
Electric Switches – Off Fuel Shutoff – In 
Master Switch – On Fuel Selector – Both 
Avionics Switch – On FREEZE Red Button – On 
 On MFD – Press ENTER 
 
4. Setup scenario on Gist laptop: 
a. Initial environment: 
i. Cloud Layer 1: Bkn 300-1,500’. Cloud Layer 2: Sct 7,000-10,000’ 
ii. Wind @ Sfc, 2,000’: 270@20. Wind @ 4,500’: 270@60 
iii. Day 
iv. VIS ON @ 20sm, and Scud OFF 
b. Initial fuel on board: 17gallons 
c. Initial position: KAJYE (66 NM north of PIE/37 south of CTY on V35) 
d. Initial attitude:  
i. Wings level, pitch +2* 
ii. Heading 352*, altitude 4,500’, Airspeed 110 kts 
5. Settle the subject in the simulator chair. Have the subject start the scenario. 
a. After subject is seated, start recording 
i. Start cameras 
ii. Start audio recorder 
b. “When you’re ready, go ahead and start the scenario by pressing the red 
pause/unpause button” 
6. Scenario Timeline: 
a. Subject starts the scenario; no further action by the HAL operator. 
a. Subject notices where they are, low fuel and GS (Problem detected) 
b. Subject projects whether or not can make the destination 
c. Participant starts decision process: divert, checklists, communicate 
d. After on a course for :03 (or on original course for :30), tell the participant 
to freeze the Mentor. “Please press the red pause/unpause button.” 
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7. Complete the Guided Discussion. “Thank you for your time. You will be 
compensated for this session (1 hour) after completing all sessions.” 
8. Repeat steps 3-4 to reset the simulator controls to flight ready conditions. 
9. Repeat steps 5-7 for next subject. 
When the testing day is concluded, complete AATD shutdown checklist 
 
